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MARYLAND CUSTODY LAW-FULLY COMMITTED TO THE
CHILD'S BEST INTERESTS?
JOHN W. ESTER*
The resolution of a custody dispute between parents or between
parents and substitute parents is particularly difficult, not because of
the complexity of the "rules" involved, but because of the nature of the
problem. In both situations the child's existing family is disintegrating
or threatening to disintegrate and the child can do little to keep it to-
gether - the child is "a victim of his environmental circumstances,
* . . he is greatly at risk."' The child is "at risk" because his or her
welfare, "both present and future, is usually profoundly affected by the
court's resolution of the private dispute over who shall be entrusted
with its care."2 The child is "at risk" also because he or she is likely to
feel abandoned3 and experience grief.4 "No matter how the custodial
arrangements are made, the child will sustain an inevitable deprivation
S. .. Awareness of this fact will precipitate any or all of the possible
grief responses in the child. He may become depressed [or] 'bad'. Or
he may fail in such life tasks as school performance." 5 Thus the child
should be the focal point of such litigation. The courts must act in the
context of litigation between adversaries who sometimes argue that
their "rights" must be considered, but the "rights" of the adult litigants
should not be the determining factor. "In such disputes it is always the
child who is not only the innocent victim, but who has the most at
stake."6 Therefore, the courts should strive to further the child's best
interests,7 not the adult litigants' "rights."
* A.B. 1956, Pasadena College; J.D. 1959, Willamette University; LL.M. 1962, Univer-
sity of Illinois. Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
54 (1973).
2. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 174, 372 A.2d 582, 584 (1977).
3. J. DESPERT, CHILDREN OF DIVORCE 17 (1962).
4. Watson, The Children of Armageddon. Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21
SYRACUSE L. REV. 55, 72 (1969).
5. Id.
6. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 173-74, 372 A.2d 582, 584 (1977).
7. In Sullivan v. Auslaender, 12 Md. App. 1, 3 n.2, 276 A.2d 698, 699 n.2 (1971), the
court said:
That securing the welfare and promoting the best interest of the child is decisive is
emphasized by the various other ways reference is made to that "clean and well de-
fined" requirement. It was stated to be the "paramount question" in Piotrowski v. State,
179 Md. 377, 381; the "sole question" in Young v. Weaver, 185 Md. 328, 331; the "para-
mount consideration" in Glick v. Glick, 232 Md. 244, 248; the "determining factor" in
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Because custody litigation should be concerned primarily with the
child's best interests, it might seem to follow that the child's "rights"
are central to such litigation. For example, one might say: the child
has a "right" to companionship and affection and to live in a home that
will provide the best possible environment; if the child's best interests
are adversely affected by a custodian's wrongful conduct, then the child
has a "right" to have the conduct stopped or to have a new custodian
appointed; and so forth.8 However, while it is possible to speak in
terms of the child's "rights" (and obligations?) and the custodian's "ob-
ligations" (and rights?), neither the problem of custody in general nor
the resolution of specific custody disputes is thereby made easier to re-
solve. In fact, any attempt to itemize the basic rights of a child or the
basic obligations of a custodian is likely to divert the decisionmaker's
attention from the special nature of child custody litigation. Each case
is unique due to the nature of the circumstances that ought to be con-
sidered before a decision is reached, and the decision itself must be
based not only on past events, but also on a prediction concerning the
future.9 Moreover, the child's environment has either recently dis-
integrated or is disintegrating, and the child's new environment is likely
to be sufficiently different from the old to create serious adjustment
problems.'" Add to all of this the likelihood that the litigation will pro-
voke strong emotions, including anger and feelings of wounded pride,
and one begins to appreciate why "judges continually characterize cus-
tody litigation as the most taxing and frustrating part of their work.""l
In order to perform this most frustrating task with any hope of
success, the judge must carefully evaluate the many intangible factors
that might affect the child's welfare. Even at a young age, each child is
a complex individual whose welfare cannot be resolved without exam-
ining such things as the child's personality, physical and mental health,
aptitudes, and emotional needs and attachments.' 2 Similarly, the judge
must view each potential custodian as a unique individual having both
Heaver v. Bradley, supra, at 242; the "ultimate test" in Fanning v. Warfield supra, at 24;
"of transcendent importance" in Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 116.
8. For attempts to itemize the "rights" of children, see Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights
for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343, 347 (1972); H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 1033 (1976).
9. H. CLARK, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 1026 (3d ed. 1980);
Land, Children, in MARYLAND DIVORCE AND SEPARATION LAW 157-58 (J. Ester ed., Md.
Inst. Cont. Prof. Educ. of Laws 1979).
10. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD, 31-34 (1973); H. CLARK, supra note 9, at 1026.
i. B. BOTEIN, TRIAL JUDGE 273 (1952).
12. See, e.g., Trenton v. Christ, 216 Md. 418, 422-23, 140 A.2d 660, 662 (1958); Piotrow-
ski v. State, 179 Md. 377, 383, 18 A.2d 199, 201 (1941).
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strengths and weaknesses - a person who will sometimes help and
sometimes hinder the child's physical well being and intellectual and
emotional growth. 3 In addition, the court must consider future rela-
tionships between the child and persons other than the custodian, par-
ticularly relationships with siblings, stepbrothers and stepsisters, peers,
grandparents, and other relatives. 14 The characteristics of the environ-
ment provided by a potential custodian are also relevant. 5 Will the
child have a "decent place to live"? What opportunities will the child
have for education and eventual employment? And finally, a court
cannot avoid at least thinking about the interests that the state may
have. For example, which custodian is most likely to teach the child to
be a "good, law abiding citizen"? Will an award of custody to one
claimant rather than the other be more likely to create a need for
financial assistance from the state?
So. It may be tempting to think of custody disputes in terms of
"rights" and "obligations," particularly for lawyers and judges who are
likely to feel comfortable (we hope) with the process of analyzing a
problem in terms of adversaries' "rights." However, a custody dispute
ought not to fit into that comfortable pattern. Although the courts
should consider the competing interests of all persons who will have a
significant relationship with the child,' 6 they ought not to view these
interests as the warring adversaries' "rights." The court's ultimate pur-
pose is not to secure an adult's rights, but to further a child's welfare.
This is undoubtedly why Maryland cases have insisted that the deter-
mining factor must always be the child's best "interests."' 7
If achieving this goal is as "taxing and frustrating" as judges claim,
then the most troublesome problems may be finding judges who have
both the inclination and ability to decide such cases and providing
them with the time needed to do so. Perhaps King Solomon's contribu-
tion to the folk lore of child custody disputes is still mentioned today' 8
13. Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 360, 157 A.2d 442, 448 (1960); Kirstukas v. Kirstukas, 14
Md. App. 190, 197, 286 A.2d 535, 539 (1972). See generally Andrews v. Andrews, 242 Md.
143, 218 A.2d 194 (1966); Palmer v. Palmer, 238 Md. 327, 207 A.2d 481 (1965).
14. E.g., Burns v. Bines, 189 Md. 157, 165, 55 A.2d 487, 490-91 (1947); Kartman v.
Kartman, 163 Md. 19, 26, 161 A. 269, 271 (1932); Barsallo v. Barsallo, 18 Md. App. 560, 570,
308 A.2d 457, 462 (1973).
15. See, e.g., Bray v. Bray, 225 Md. 476, 483, 171 A.2d 500, 503 (1961); Melton v. Con-
nolly, 219 Md. 184, 187, 148 A.2d 387, 388 (1959); Alston v. Thomas, 161 Md. 617, 620-21,
158 A. 24, 25 (1932).
16. E.g., Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 351, 86 A.2d 463, 468 (1952); Dietrich v. Anderson,
185 Md. 103, 119-20, 43 A.2d 186, 193 (1945); Kartman v. Kartman, 163 Md. 19, 26, 161 A.
269, 271-72 (1932).
17. See supra cases cited note 7.
18. See, e.g., Montgomery County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406,
19821
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because his "wisdom" was in devising a test that (a) provided the
"right" conclusion, (b) was easy to administer, and (c) resulted in a
quick resolution of a difficult problem. If there are other tests or rules
that can serve these functions, keeping in mind that a "right" conclu-
sion is reached only if the child's best interests are secured, then we
would be wise indeed to adopt them.
I. THE EFFICACY OF PRESUMPTIONS
A. The Maternal Preference Doctrine
Is it possible that a custody dispute between the parents can be
more quickly and easily resolved, and the child's best interests fur-
thered, if the courts presume that one parent's sex makes that person a
better custodian?
"Under the early English common law the father had the absolute
right to custody regardless of the welfare of the child."' 9 This absolute
right was given to the father because he alone had the obligation to
support the couple's children; therefore, it was claimed, he should have
a correlative right to their custody.2" Since the welfare of the child was
irrelevant, the courts might more accurately have spoken of the father's
absolute right to possession of a thing, rather than custody of a child.
In 1929, the Maryland legislature enacted article 72A, section 1,
providing that "the father and mother are the joint natural guardians of
their minor child and. . . they shall have equal powers and duties, and
neither parent has any right superior to the right of the other concern-
ing the child's custody .. .. *"I' Although the Maryland House and
Senate Journals do not indicate why this statute was enacted,22 the
plain meaning of the statutory language indicates that one purpose was
to abolish the father's "absolute" (i.e., "superior") right to custody
under the early common law. Surprisingly, however, the Maryland
Court of Appeals spoke of fathers' rights after article 72A was enacted
and did so without explaining how a father could have a "superior"
right notwithstanding a statute declaring that "neither parent has any
414, 381 A.2d 1154, 1160 (1977); Note, Best Interests of the Child: Maryland Child Custody
Disputes, 37 MD. L. REV. 641 (1978).
19. McAndrew v. McAndrew, 39 Md. App. 1, 4, 382 A.2d 1081, 1083 (1978); see also
Haddad & Roman, No Fault Custody, 2 FAM. L. REV. 95, 96-97 (1979).
20. McAndrew v. McAndrew, 39 Md. App. 1, 4, 382 A.2d 1081, 1083 (1978).
21. 1929 Md. Laws ch. 561, § 1.
22. Legislative intent occasionally is stated in a preamble or suggested by changes to a
proposed statute prior to enactment. There are no such indications of legislative intent for
article 72A, § 1. See 1929 MD. S. JOUR.; 1929 MD. H. JOUR.
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right superior" to those of the other.23 Even more surprising is the fact
that, when the paternal preference rule began to disappear, the Court
of Appeals was developing a "maternal preference" doctrine without
explaining how a maternal preference was consistent with the strong
language in article 72A.2 '
The maternal preference doctrine is easy to state: "Ordinarily, the
welfare of a young child, particularly a girl, is best served by awarding
custody to the mother. '25 The justification given for this doctrine was
that it
is simply a recognition by the law, as well as by the commonality
of man, of the universal verity that the maternal tie is so primor-
dial that it should not lightly be severed or attenuated. The appre-
ciation of this visceral bond between mother and child will always
be placed upon the balance scales .... 26
Those who might question the propriety of prefering the mother,
merely because she is a mother, are therefore placed in the position of
appearing to attack "motherhood."
Before considering whether to launch such an attack, we first need
to examine two problems concerning when and how this doctrine ap-
plies. First, how "young" must the child be in order for the "maternal
tie" to be sufficiently "primordial" to give the mother a preference? In
Parker v. Parker,27 a case involving the custody of an eight year old
boy, the court concluded that the maternal preference doctrine had no
application, but failed to clarify whether that was because of the child's
age, sex, or both. On the other hand, the courts relied on the preference
in Cullotta v. Cullotta,28 in which the oldest of the four children was
almost ten, and in Kirstukas v. Kirstukas,29 in which the children were
23. MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (1978) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Piotrowski v. State,
179 Md. 377, 381, 382, 18 A.2d 199, 200, 201 (1941) (however, the determining factor was the
child's best interests).
24. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 191 Md. 396, 408, 62 A.2d 293, 298-99 (1948).
25. Alden v. Alden, 226 Md. 622, 624, 174 A.2d 793, 794 (1961). The phrase, "particu-
larly a girl," is sometimes not included; the doctrine has been used for both boys and girls.
Compare id with Cooke v. Cooke, 21 Md. App. 376, 319 A.2d 841 (1974) (no significance
attributed to the child's being a boy). The phrase, "tender years," is sometimes used instead
of "young child." E.g., Roussey v. Roussey, 210 Md. 261, 264, 123 A.2d 354, 355 (1956).
26. Kirstukas v. Kirstukas, 14 Md. App. 190, 196, 286 A.2d 535, 538 (1972). A Missouri
court expressed a similar idea by saying that "there is but a twilight zone between a mother's
love and the atmosphere of heaven." Tuter v. Tuter, 120 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Mo. Ct. App.
1938).
27. 222 Md. 69, 75, 158 A.2d 607, 610 (1960).
28. 193 Md. 374, 384, 66 A.2d 919, 924 (1949).
29. 14 Md. App. 190, 192, 196, 286 A.2d 535, 536, 538 (1972).
1982]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
five, nine, and ten years old. The safest conclusion is that the Mary-
land cases leave "unclear" how young the child must be.
The second problem relates to the procedural effect of the doctrine
when it applies. Because Maryland cases claimed that young children
"should not be separated from their mother without grave and weighty
reasons"30 and that "[uinless the mother is an unfitperson she is usually
preferred where the children are of tender years,"'" the mother in Kir-
stukas argued that the doctrine functioned as a presumption. She
maintained that she should win unless proven unfit to be a custodian.
In rejecting her argument, the Court of Special Appeals responded that
the
so-called "preference" for the mother. . . is simply a recognition
by the law [of a factor which is so basic and important that it] will
always be placed upon the balance scales and, all else being equal
or nearly so, will tilt them. As heavy a factor as it may be, how-
ever, it is still but a factor. Every statement of the preference is
hedged about by the context, "all else being equal." If, after giv-
ing due weight to the maternal preference, the scales nonetheless
demonstrate the better suitability of the father or, indeed, of some
third person to serve the interests of the child, the path for the
chancellor is clearly indicated.32
Although this statement made it clear that the mother should not win
merely because the father fails to prove that she is unfit, it is ambiguous
in another respect. A subsequent Court of Special Appeals case inter-
preted it to mean that the maternal preference doctrine is merely a "tie-
breaker," as suggested by the phrase "all else being equal or nearly so,
[the maternal preference] will tilt [the balance scales]." 3 3 However, the
last sentence in the quote above reads: "If, after giving due weight to
the maternal preference, the scales nonetheless demonstrate the better
suitability of the father . . . .,3' How can the maternal preference
doctrine be merely a "tie-breaker" if it is possible for the scales to tip in
thefather's favor "after giving due weight to the maternal preference"?
This suggests that the maternal preference doctrine is not merely a "tie-
breaker" to be used only after all other factors have been weighed, but
that it is a "heavy" factor that should "always be placed upon the bal-
ance scales. . .. -3" The Court of Appeals has not eliminated this un-
30. Cullotta v. Cullotta, 193 Md. 374, 384, 66 A.2d 919, 924 (1949) (emphasis added).
31. Roussey v. Roussey, 210 Md. 261, 264, 123 A.2d 354, 355 (1956) (emphasis added).
32. Kirstukas v. Kirstukas 14 Md. App. 190, 196, 286 A.2d 535, 538 (1972).
33. Cooke v. Cooke, 21 Md. App. 376, 380, 319 A.2d 841, 843 (1974).
34. Kirstukas v. Kirstukas, 14 Md. App. 190, 196, 286 A.2d 535, 538 (1972) (emphasis
added).
35. See id. (emphasis added).
[VOL. 41
CHILD'S BEST INTERESTS
certainty. Although the court has never used the term "tie-breaker," it
has said that the custody of young children is ordinarily awarded to the
mother rather than the father "when other things are equal," 36 thereby
suggesting a "tie-breaker" role for the maternal preference doctrine.
However, other Court of Appeals decisions seem to view the doctrine
as the source of an important factor that is always entitled to great
weight 7.3  The safest conclusion, once again, is that Maryland law is
"unclear."
These questions may be moot, for in McAndrew v. McAndrew, 38
the Court of Special Appeals recently concluded that the maternal pref-
erence doctrine is no longer a part of Maryland law. Although the
party opposing the doctrine relied on Maryland's Equal Rights
Amendment,39 the court based its decision exclusively on a 1974
amendment to article 72A, section 1, which provided that "in any cus-
tody proceeding, neither parent shall be given preference solely be-
cause of his or her sex."'4° The court reasoned that "at the time this Act
was passed, there was no preference of either spouse in a custody pro-
ceeding, based on sex, other than the maternal preference. '"' There-
fore, the court concluded, the only conceivable purpose for the 1974
amendment was abolition of the maternal preference rule. Although
there are still no Court of Appeals cases in point, and the issue may
therefore be "open," the Court of Appeals most likely will agree with
the Court of Special Appeals. In Rand v. Rand,12 the Court of Appeals
declared that the "clear and unambiguous" language in Maryland's
Equal Rights Amendment was "cogent evidence that the people of
Maryland are fully committed to equal rights for men and women,"
and that, therefore, "[c]hild support awards must be made on a sexless
basis."43 For the same reasons, Maryland's Equal Rights Amendment
may demand that custody, like child support, be awarded on a sexless
basis.
If the Court of Appeals agrees, it might abolish the maternal pref-
erence doctrine, relying only on Maryland's Equal Rights Amendment
36. Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 357, 157 A.2d 442, 446 (1960).
37. See, e.g., Oberlander v. Oberander, 256 Md. 672, 676, 261 A.2d 727, 729 (1970);
Roussey v. Roussey, 210 Md. 261, 264, 123 A.2d 354, 355 (1956); Cullotta v. Cullotta, 193
Md. 374, 384, 66 A.2d 919, 924 (1949).
38. 39 Md. App. 1, 382 A.2d 1081 (1978).
39. Id. at 8 n.9, 382 A.2d at 1085 n.9; see MD. CONST. Decl. of Rights art. 46 (enacted
1972).
40. 1974 Md. Laws ch. 181 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (1978)).
41. McAndrew v. McAndrew, 39 Md. App. 1, 8, 382 A.2d 1081, 1085 (1978) (emphasis
added).
42. 280 Md. 508, 511-12, 374 A.2d 900, 903 (1977).
43. Id. at 515-16, 374 A.2d at 905.
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and the 1974 amendment to article 72A. However, the court should
discuss an additional question because of its significance in regard to
other child custody issues: Do "preferences",or "presumptions" im-
properly dilute Maryland's commitment to resolving such cases in ac-
cordance with the child's best interests? Limiting our present inquiry to
the maternal preference doctrine, motherhood should not give all
claimants who are mothers a "preference" over all claimants who are
fathers, unless Kirstukas was correct that there is a "universal verity"
making it significantly more likely that a young child's welfare ordina-
rily is best served by awarding custody to the mother." If the courts
are to rely on this "verity," they must demonstrate - not merely as-
sume or declare - that mothers as a class of persons are born with
physical, intellectual, or emotional endowments, or have subsequently
acquired skills, that make them better able than fathers to care for
young children. The Maryland cases have not demonstrated that
mothers have any such superiority; they have only assumed or declared
that they do.45 Undoubtedly some mothers are better able than some
fathers to care for the child involved: "[D]ifferences between the par-
ents. . . [that] bear upon their ability to provide the care needed by the
child"46 are clearly relevant and should be considered. However, a
child needs good "parenting"; therefore, the inquiry should always fo-
cus on determining which of the parents is best equipped with the
parenting skills, attitudes, and personality characteristics needed by the
specific child.47 A maternal or paternal preference, even if used only as
a "tie-breaker," improperly diverts attention from this need to individ-
ualize each custody dispute.
Even if the Court of Appeals rejects the maternal preference doc-
trine, decisionmakers may continue to prefer mothers as custodians for
young children. Attitudes are hard to change.48 Indeed, in the very act
44. See Kirstukas v. Kirstukas, 14 Md. App. 190, 196, 286 A.2d 535, 538 (1972). Some
recent studies support the conclusion that this "universal verity" is not true. Foster & Freed,
Life With Father.- 1978, 11 FAM. L.Q. 321, 334 (1978); Orthner & Lewis, Evidence of Single-
Father Competence in Childrearing, 13 FAM. L.Q. 27 (1979); see Note, supra note 18, at 654-
55.
45. See, e.g., Alden v. Alden, 226 Md. 622, 624, 174 A.2d 793, 794 (1961); Roussey v.
Roussey, 210 Md. 261, 264, 123 A.2d 354, 355 (1956); Cullotta v. Cullotta, 193 Md. 374, 384,
66 A.2d 919, 924 (1949); Kirstukas v. Kirstukas, 14 Md. App. 190, 196, 286 A.2d 535, 538
(1972).
46. McAndrew v. McAndrew, 39 Md. App. 1, 8-9, 382 A.2d 1081, 1086 (1978).
47. "Studies of maternal deprivation have shown that the essential experience for the
child is that of mothering - the warmth, consistency and continuity of the relationship,
rather than the sex of the individual who is performing the mothering function." Watts v.
Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 182, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 290 (Fan. Ct. 1973).
48. Although New York no longer retains the maternal preference rule, a recent study
indicated that New York courts still award custody to the mother in nine out of ten cases.
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of discrediting the doctrine, the Court of Special Appeals revealed how
the doctrine may be dressed in other words and continue in force:
This is not to suggest that the best interests of the child may not
require a consideration of the biological and psychological dffer-
ences between the parents (or other potential custodians) to the ex-
tent that they bear upon their ability to provide the care needed by
the child at the time. The inquiry here must concern the needs of
the particular child and each of the parties' relationship with the
child. A parent is no longer presumed to be clothed with or to lack
a particular attribute merely because that parent is male or
female.49
The court is right, but those who would perpetuate the maternal prefer-
ence doctrine may do so fairly easily by eliminating from their declared
reasoning any hint of a preference for mothers, and by talking instead
in terms of specific "biological and psychological differences between
the parents." However, the necessity to disguise the maternal prefer-
ence doctrine will force the decisionmaker to speak in terms of specific
facts rather than in terms of an assumption or preference based on a
parent's sex. The need to speak in terms of specific facts may well im-
press upon the decisionmaker the need to think in terms of specific facts
rather than assumptions. This is the primary reason for abolishing the
maternal preference doctrine.
B. The Presumption Against An Adulterous Parent
Should an adulterous parent be presumed "unfit" to raise a child?
For many years, Maryland cases recognized such a presumption,50 "not
as a matter of punishment or reward, but because it is assumed that the
child will be reared in a cleaner and more wholesome moral atmos-
phere."' ' That some element of punishment probably was involved, is
suggested by the absence of any requirement that the parent's adultery
must have had some actual effect on the child's welfare or that the child
must have at least known or had reason to know that "immoral" con-
Haddad & Roman, No-Fault Custody, 2 FAM. L. REV. 95, 95 (1979). One apparent reason
for this imbalance is that many New York judges and lawyers still think in terms of the
traditional bias favoring mothers. Id.; see also Miller, Joint Custody, 13 FAM. L.Q. 345, 353
(1979) (suggesting that this disparity between theoretical equality and practical application
exists in many states).
49. McAndrew v. McAndrew, 39 Md. App. 1, 8-9, 382 A.2d 1081, 1086 (1978) (emphasis
added).
50. See, e.g., Palmer v. Palmer, 238 Md. 327, 331, 207 A.2d 481, 483 (1965); Wallis v.
Wallis, 235 Md. 33, 36-37, 200 A.2d 164, 165-66 (1964) and cases cited therein.
51. Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 358, 157 A.2d 442, 447 (1960); accord Raible v. Raible,
242 Md. 586, 594, 219 A.2d 777, 780 (1966).
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duct had occurred.52 Punishment also is suggested by such cases as
Pangle v. Pangle," in which the Court of Appeals said: "Having lost
his wife through her misconduct, he ought not to be deprived of the
custody of his daughter and subjected to the humiliation of surrender-
ing her to the support and control of the author of his marital misfor-
tune." There also seems to be an element of punishment in the heavy
burden of proof placed on an adulterous parent who attempted to rebut
the presumption. Such a parent was required to make a "strong show-
ing" that "the adulterous relationship has ceased and appears unlikely
to be revived because [she] has changed her way of living . . .-.
Marriage to the former paramour, which might have shown at least an
attempt to change one's "way of living," was held insufficient to rebut
the presumption,15 and seemed to be viewed in some cases as addi-
tional evidence of unfitness.56 To be "strong" enough to rebut the pre-
sumption, there had to be evidence of "repentence," of termination of
the illicit affair, and of conduct demonstrating rehabilitation.-7 As
might be expected, judges sometimes disagreed as to whether this rigor-
ous standard was satisfied.58
Beginning in the early 1970's, Maryland cases began to suggest a
possible relaxation of the presumption against an adulterous parent,59
52. The cases cited notes 50-51 supra, do not mention any such requirement. In Mul-
linix v. Mullinix, 12 Md. App. 402, 278 A.2d 674 (1971), the court used the presumption
although the record indicated that the four children involved were not aware of their
mother's adultery.
53. 134 Md. 166, 170, 106 A. 337, 338 (1919).
54. Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 358, 157 A.2d 442, 447 (1960); accord Palmer v. Palmer,
238 Md. 327, 331, 207 A.2d 481, 484 (1965).
55. McCabe v. McCabe, 218 Md. 378, 146 A.2d 768 (1958); Pangle v. Pangle, 134 Md.
166, 106 A. 337 (1919).
56. See Bray v. Bray, 225 Md. 476, 483-84, 171 A.2d 500, 504 (1961); Pangle v. Pangle,
134 Md. 166, 169, 106 A. 337, 338 (1919). The dissenting opinion in Hild v. Hild, 221 Md.
349, 364-65, 157 A.2d 442, 450-51 (1960) (Hammond, J., dissenting), made a particularly
strong argument against viewing marriage to the paramour as additional evidence of
unfitness.
57. Raible v. Raible, 242 Md. 586, 594, 219 A.2d 777, 780 (1966); Wallis v. Wallis, 235
Md. 33, 37, 200 A.2d 164, 166 (1964); Wood v. Wood, 227 Md. 112, 115, 175 A.2d 573, 574-
75 (1961).
58. Compare, e.g., Cornwell v. Cornwell, 244 Md. 674, 224 A.2d 870 (1966) (awarding
custody to the adulterous mother) with id. at 680, 224 A.2d at 874 (Barnes, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the standard was not satisfied). See Parker v. Parker, 222 Md. 69, 158 A.2d 607
(1960) for an example of a case in which the court could have concluded that the presump-
tion was rebutted, but did not. The mother testified that she had "repented," that she was
sorry for her misconduct, and that she had joined a church. Her pastor's favorable testi-
mony was not enough to dispel the court's doubts concerning the sincerity of her repentance.
59. See Pontoro v. Pontoro, 257 Md. 576, 263 A.2d 820 (1970); Neuwiller v. Neuwiller,
257 Md. 285, 262 A.2d 736 (1970).
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and in 1977, the Court of Appeals abolished it in Davis v. Davis.6° The
court noted that "rapid social and moral changes in our society" justi-
fied a reexamination of the presumption, and concluded that "a finding
of adultery per se [is not] a 'highly persuasive indicium of unfitness,'"
but is merely one factor that "should be weighed, along with all other
pertinent factors, only insofar as it affects the child's welfare.' The
meaning of this new rule was tested just two years later in Swain v.
Swain. 62 The circuit court had concluded that, but for the mother's
adultery, it was in her children's best interests to live with her. Her
adultery, however, posed a particularly difficult problem because she
had continued living with her paramour until the date of the hearing,
and her children were aware of the relationship - he was in their
apartment when the children went to bed at night and there when they
got up in the morning. However, the circuit court judge found nothing
"that mars or stains in any way the life of the children" 63 and con-
cluded that the children's awareness of their mother's adultery did not
outweigh the circumstances otherwise supporting the conclusion that it
was in their best interests to live with their mother. On appeal, the
father argued that Davis abolished the presumption that an adulterous
parent was unfit, but not the presumption that exposure to an adulter-
ous relationship has an adverse effect on a child's welfare.' The Court
of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court's award to the mother, and
said that Davis means:
[Tihere are now no presumptions whatsoever with respect to the
fitness of a parent who has committed, or is committing, adultery.
Rather, adultery is relevant only insofar as it actually affects a
child's welfare . . . . [T]he mere fact of adultery cannot "tip the
balance" against a parent in the fitness determination. Thus, a
chancellor should weigh, not the adultery itself, but only any ac-
tual harmful effect that is supported by the evidence.65
60. 280 Md. 119, 372 A.2d 231, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977). In all but two of the
earlier Maryland appellate cases, the mother had been the adulterous parent. In Raible v.
Raible, 242 Md. 586, 219 A.2d 777 (1966), and Trudeau v. Trudeau, 204 Md. 214, 221, 103
A.2d 563, 566 (1954), that the father also had committed adultery was mentioned as possibly
having some bearing on his fitness as a custodian, but no presumption was used against him.
Since the Davis case abolished the presumption, this possible violation of Maryland's Equal
Rights Amendment, MD. CONST. Decl. of Rights art. 46 (enacted 1972), need not be
resolved.
61. Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 127, 372 A.2d 231, 235 (emphasis added), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 939 (1977).
62. 43 Md. App. 622, 406 A.2d 680 (1979).
63. Id. at 625, 406 A.2d at 682.
64. Id. at 629, 406 A.2d at 683.
65. Id. at 629, 406 A.2d at 683-84. By taking this position, the Court of Special Appeals
aligned itself with the three members of the United States Supreme Court who would have
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Davis and Swain are particularly important, not merely because
they made it clear that there are no presumptions concerning a parent's
adultery, but also because they relied upon a principle that ought to be
used in all custody disputes: A particular circumstance concerning a
child's parent, whether it be the parent's conduct, morality, attitude, or
whatever, ought to be considered only if it has had, or will have, some
actual effect on the child's welfare. Custody litigation ought not to be
used as justification for declaring open season on a parent's privacy,
and to the extent that a parent's character and beliefs, or private inter-
ests and activities, do not actually affect the child's welfare, they should
not be considered at a custody hearing.
66
C. The Presumption Favoring Parents Over Others
Where parents claim the custody of a child, there is aprimafacie
presumption that the child's welfare will be best subserved in the
care and custody of its parents rather than in the custody of others,
and the burden is then cast upon the parties opposing them to
show the contrary. 7
Although in Powers v. Hadden,61 the court claimed that this "pa-
granted certiorari in Jarrett v. Jarrett, 449 U.S. 927 (1980). The Illinois Supreme Court had
concluded that a divorced mother's violation of a fornication statute by cohabiting with a
man she had not married, justified awarding custody of her children to their father because
of the possibility that her children's awareness of the illicit relationship might adversely
affect their future welfare. Since the relationship had existed for some time and was not
shown to have had any actual adverse effect on the children, the three dissenting Justices
argued that the Illinois court improperly used what amounted to a conclusive presumption:
"Nothing in the record or in logic supports a conclusion that divorced parents who fornicate,
for that reason alone, are unfit or adversely affect the well-being and development of their
children. ... Id. at 930. They also maintained that a custody decision based on such a
conclusive presumption resulted in the denial of a hearing at which the mother could present
evidence of facts that might justify an award in her favor, thereby depriving her of her
fourteenth amendment right to a meaningful hearing. The Court cited Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972), in which the Supreme Court struck down a conclusive presumption that
an unmarried father was not fit to have custody, as authority for the proposition that certio-
rari should have been granted and that the conclusive presumption used against the mother
should have been invalidated.
66. See Andrews v. Andrews, 242 Md. 143, 147, 218 A.2d 194, 196-97 (1966).
67. Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 351, 86 A.2d 463, 468 (1952). Although not relied upon in
Ross v. Pick, or in other Maryland cases applying the parental presumption, see infra cases
cited notes 68-76 there is statutory authority for the presumption:
Provided: The provisions of this article shall not be deemed to affect the existing law
relative to the appointment of a third person as guardian of the person of the minor
where the parents are unsuitable, or the child's interests would be adversely affected by
remaining under the natural guardianship of its parent or parents.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (1978). This provision should be repealed if Maryland's legis-
lature decides to discard the parental presumption.
68. 30 Md. App. 577, 583, 353 A.2d 641, 645 (1976).
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rental presumption" is "not based upon sympathetic concern for the
parent nor upon parent's rights," many Maryland cases assert that the
"law of nature" gives parents a "right" to the custody of "their own"
children.69 At the same time, courts sometimes say substitute parents
have "rights" concerning custody, or at least a strong and legitimate
interest because it is but "fair and proper that their previous faithful-
ness, and the interest and affection which these labors have created in
them, should be respected."70 Having identified opposing "rights," the
courts then strike a balance by saying that "the right of either parent is
ordinarily superior to that of anyone else."'" Finally, to complete their
justification for the presumption favoring parents, the courts assert that
it is ordinarily in the child's best interests to live with a parent because
"[tihe affection which springs from [the relation of parent and child] is
stronger and more potent than any which springs from any other
human relation,"72 and the strength of this affection "leads to desire
and efforts to care properly for and raise the child, which are greater
than another would be likely to display."73
Whether these arguments adequately justify a presumption favor-
ing biological parents, may depend to some extent upon how difficult it
is to convince a court that the presumption has been rebutted. Unfor-
tunately, there is some uncertainty in Maryland as to what a non-par-
ent must prove in order to succeed. In Ross v. Hoffman,74 the court said
the presumption was so strong that
it is only upon a determination by the equity court that [1] the
parent is unfit or [2] that there are exceptional circumstances which
make custody in the parent detrimental to the best interests of the
child, that the court need inquire into the best interests of the child
in order to make a proper custodial disposition.75
Other cases have agreed that the burden of proof is heavy, but have not
even mentioned the stringent requirement imposed on the foster par-
ents in Ross v. Hoffman. Rather than holding that non-parents must
69. Eg., Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 352, 86 A.2d 463, 468 (1952); Dietrich v. Anderson,
185 Md. 103, 118, 43 A.2d 186, 192 (1945); Kartman v. Kartman, 163 Md. 19, 23, 161 A. 269,
270 (1932); see also White v. Seward, 187 Md. 43, 48, 48 A.2d 335, 338 (1946).
70. Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 119-20, 43 A.2d 186, 193 (1945); accord Ross v.
Pick, 199 Md. 341, 352, 86 A.2d 463, 469 (1952).
71. Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 351, 86 A.2d 463, 468 (1952).
72. Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 118, 43 A.2d 186, 192 (1945).
73. Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md. 184, 188, 148 A.2d 387, 389 (1959).
74. 280 Md. 172, 372 A.2d 582 (1977).
75. Id. at 178-79, 372 A.2d at 587 (emphasis added); accord Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341,
351, 86 A.2d 463, 468 (1952); Powers v. Hadden, 30 Md. App. 577, 584, 353 A.2d 641, 645
(1976).
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specifically show that a parent is "unfit" or that there are "exceptional
circumstances," these cases merely require a strong showing that it is
not in the child's best interests for the parent to have custody.76
Perhaps the best way to understand what Maryland courts require
is to look at cases that awarded custody to non-parents. A variety of
factors was involved: (1) The child was only an infant when left by its
parents with others - three and one-half months;77 four months;78 ten
months.7 9 (2) The child had been separated from its parents for a long
period of time - eight and one-half years; 0 four and one-half years;8
two and one-half years;8 2 ten years.83 (3) The parent had, to some ex-
tent, neglected or abandoned the child. 4  (4) The parent rarely at-
tempted to visit the child - sporadic visits; 5 infrequent visits for the
first three years, followed by none for two and one-half years.8 6 (5) The
parent made little or no contribution toward the child's support.8 7
(6) There was some basis for questioning the sincerity of the parent's
current interest in having custody - no attempt was made to obtain
custody until the foster parents attempted to adopt the child;8 8 the
mother was asking for the custody of a child she probably had not seen
for almost ten years.8 9 (7) The child had a strong and affectionate rela-
76. DeGrange v. Kline, 254 Md. 240, 242-43, 254 A.2d 353, 354 (1969); Melton v. Con-
nolly, 219 Md. 184, 188-89, 148 A.2d 387, 389 (1959); Maddox v. Maddox, 174 Md. 470, 477,
199 A. 507, 510 (1938); Kartman V. Kartman, 163 Md. 19, 23, 161 A. 269, 270 (1932). In
Trenton v. Christ, 216 Md. 418, 420, 140 A.2d 660, 661 (1958), the court mentioned the
requirement that substitute parents have the burden of proving "unfitness" or "exceptional
circumstances," but they resolved the dispute involved without stating that either had.been
proved by the grandparents to whom custody was awarded.
77. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 181, 372 A.2d 582, 588 (1977) (substitute parents
were only babysitting for the first few weeks).
78. Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md. 184, 186, 148 A.2d 387, 388 (1959).
79. Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 106, 43 A.2d 186, 187 (1945). But see DeGrange
v. Kline, 254 Md. 240, 241, 254 A.2d 353, 354 (1969), in which the child was older - two
and one-half when first separated from his father, and then four when they finally separated.
80. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 192, 372 A.2d 582, 594 (1977).
81. Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md. 184, 186, 189, 148 A.2d 387, 388, 389-90 (1959).
82. DeGrange v. Kline, 254 Md. 240, 241, 254 A.2d 353, 353-54 (1969).
83. Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 351-52, 86 A.2d 463, 469 (1952).
84. Lippy v. Breidenstein, 249 Md. 415, 417, 240 A.2d 251, 252 (1968); Ross v. Pick, 199
Md. 341, 351-52, 86 A.2d 463, 469 (1952); Alston v. Thomas, 161 Md. 618, 620, 158 A. 24, 25
(1932).
85. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 182, 372 A.2d 582, 589 (1977).
86. Lippy v. Breidenstein, 249 Md. 415, 418, 240 A.2d 251, 253 (1968). But see Trenton
v. Christ, 216 Md. 418, 421-22, 140 A.2d 660, 662 (1958), and Maddox v. Maddox, 174 Md.
470, 472-73, 199 A. 507, 508-09 (1938), in which the parent to whom custody was denied had
visited with the child when possible, or at least had attempted to do so.
87. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 182, 372 A.2d 582, 589 (1977); Lippy v. Breidenstein,
249 Md. 415, 418, 240 A.2d 251, 253 (1968).
88. See Lippy v. Breidenstein, 249 Md. 415, 240 A.2d 251 (1968).
89. Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 351-52, 86 A.2d 463, 469 (1952).
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tionship with his or her substitute parent or parents - the substitute
parents were the child's "primary source of nurturents";9 ° the child was
given a secure home and affectionate care.9 1 (8) The child had strong
positive feelings toward the environment in which he or she had been
living - the child was happy, well adjusted, and had many friends;9 2
the eleven year old child expressed a feeling of strong attachment to his
foster parents.93 (9) A change in custody would probably be very trau-
matic for the child - would cause emotional upheaval;94 the mere con-
templation of the possibility of change produced serious emotional
upset.95 (10) And finally, many miscellaneous factors, such as a pattern
of misconduct on the parent's part,96 and a significant difference be-
tween the physicial characteristics of the two homes. 97 In each of the
cases discussed, several of the above factors were present, and it is clear
that no one factor would have justified an award to the non-parent.
All but one of the cases cited above were decided prior to 1973,98
the publication date of Beyond the Best Interests of the Child.99 In this
book, Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit introduce a
new approach to child custody decisions. They favor awarding custody
to a "psychological parent," who will not necessarily be a biological
parent. A "psychological parent" is defined as "one who, on a continu-
ing, day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay,
and mutuality, fullflls the child's psychological needs for a parent, as
well as the child's physical needs.' Once established as a child's psy-
chological parent, a person remains that child's psychological parent
until there is such a break in the continuity of the relationship that the
child stops thinking of him or her as a psychological parent. 01
The authors formulate several guidelines for making custody deci-
sions; each contributes to their conclusion that custody should normally
90. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 182, 372 A.2d 582, 589 (1977).
91. Piotrowski v. State, 179 Md. 377, 383, 18 A.2d 199, 201 (1941); Maddox v. Maddox,
174 Md. 470, 475, 477, 199 A. 507, 510 (1938).
92. Trenton v. Christ, 216 Md. 418, 422, 140 A.2d 660, 662 (1958); Piotrowski v. State,
179 Md. 377, 383, 18 A.2d 199, 201 (1941).
93. Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 353-54, 86 A.2d 463, 469-70 (1952).
94. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 192, 372 A.2d 582, 594 (1977); Melton v. Connolly,
219 Md. 184, 189, 148 A.2d 387, 390 (1959).
95. Trenton v. Christ, 216 Md. 418, 422, 140 A.2d 660, 662 (1958).
96. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 181, 372 A.2d 582, 588 (1977); Lippy v. Breidenstein,
249 Md. 415, 416-17, 240 A.2d 251, 252 (1968).
97. Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md. 184, 186-87, 148 A.2d 387, 388 (1959).
98. See Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 372 A.2d 582 (1977).
99. J. GOLDSTEIN, A FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1973) [hereinafter cited as BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS].
100. Id. at 98.
101. Id. at 31-34, 40-42, 47-49.
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be awarded to the psychological parent. First, they assert that
"[clontinuity of relationships, surroundings, and environmental influ-
ence are essential for a child's normal development."'' 0 2 This implies,
not only that each child placement should be final,0 3 but that an ex-
isting relationship should not be disrupted. Interrupting such a rela-
tionship will cause a child great emotional pain."° Second, the authors
maintain that custody decisions should reflect "the child's, not the
adult's, sense of time."'0 5 A child's sense of time changes greatly with
age. The younger the child, the more rapidly he will feel abandoned if
separated from a psychological parent, and the more rapidly he will
replace the old relationship with a new one. 106 Once a new relationship
is established, a court should allow the child to remain with the person
who is in fact a psychological parent, even though the adult deci-
sionmaker may have trouble appreciating that such a strong bond
could form in what, to an adult, may seem like a short time. °7 Finally,
the authors argue that "child placement decisions must take into ac-
count the law's incapacity to supervise interpersonal relationships and
the limits of knowledge to make long-range predictions." 0 8 As the au-
thors note, no one can predict in detail a child's future development.
They conclude that we should therefore confine ourselves to those short
term predictions that they feel we can make with some accuracy. We
know, for example, that separating a child from a psychological parent
will cause the child immediate emotional pain. Accordingly, we know
that we should not disrupt such a relationship unnecessarily."° Of
course, if a child has no psychological parent, the court will have to try
to identify someone who has the capacity to become one. It should do
so as quickly as possible in order to minimize the damage that flows
from uncertainty in the child's life. " 0
The authors use these guidelines and the concept of the psycholog-
ical parent as the basis for a new standard - the "least detrimental
available alternative," which is to replace the best interests doctrine.'
102. Id. at 31-32.
103. Id. at 35.
104. Id. at 32-35.
105. Id. at 40. "Unlike adults, who measure. . . time by clock and calendar, children
have their own built-in time sense, based on the urgency of their instinctual and emotional
needs. This results in their marked intolerance for postponement of gratification or frustra-
tion, and an intense sensitivity to the length of separations." Id. at 11.
106. Id. at 31-34, 40-42, 47-49.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 49.
109. Id. at 49-52.
110. Id. at 42-45.
111. Id. at 53.
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They contend that the least detrimental available alternative will re-
quire placement with a psychological parent or with an individual who
will become a psychological parent." 2
They give several reasons for adopting the new standard. First,
although the authors agree with the manifest purpose of the best inter-
ests standard, they argue that courts often claim to be serving the
child's best interests when they actually are giving primary considera-
tion to the interests of competing adults.' 3 Second, they maintain that
focusing on the least detrimental alternative will encourage courts to
think in terms of minimizing damage to the child, who is "already a
victim of his environmental circumstances."" 4 They hope that think-
ing in this manner will prompt courts to eliminate the delays that often
attend custody litigation and are so damaging to the children con-
cerned.' 15 They suggest that the best interests standard, on the other
hand, contributes to delays by encouraging open-ended and, therefore,
lengthy inquiries." 6 And finally, the authors consider inquiries con-
cerning "best interests" to be too "awesome and grandiose," and assert
that the concept of available alternatives encourages the decisionmaker
to realize his or her inability to make accurate predictions about the
child's future." 7 They argue that the court therefore should seek only
to satisfy the immediate predictable developmental needs of the child.
Are these arguments likely to persuade a Maryland court to adopt
the psychological parent doctrine? Although Maryland cases always
have insisted that there should be a strong presumption favoring bio-
logical parents over others," 8 a careful examination of the cases in
which this presumption was rebutted reveals that Maryland courts ap-
preciated the concerns underlying the psychological parent concept
long before the 1973 publication of Beyond the Best Interests of the
Child. As early as 1938, a Maryland court stressed the importance of
maintaining the continuing relationship of mutual affection that had
existed for five years between two young girls and their substitute par-
ent." 9 In 1945, the Court of Appeals emphasized the significance of
what today might be called a psychological parent-child relationship,
when it said:
112. Id.
113. Id. at 54.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 54-55.
116. Id. at 37.
117. Id. at 63.
118. See supra cases cited notes 68-73.
119. Maddox v. Maddox, 174 Md. 470, 475, 199 A. 507, 510 (1938).
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[W]hen reclamation [of a child left with others] is not sought until
a lapse of years, when new ties have been formed and a certain
current given to the child's life and thought, much attention should
be paid to the probabilities of a benefit to the child from the
change. It is an obvious fact, that ties of blood weaken, and ties of
companionship strengthen, by lapse of time; and the prosperity
and welfare of the child depend on the number and strength of
these ties ... 120
And in two different cases involving girls who had lived with their
grandparents for approximately eight years, 12  the courts again
awarded custody to what might today be called "psychological par-
ents," although both the biological parent and the substitute parents
were found to befit andproper custodians. The courts noted the long-
standing relationships of mutual affection between the girls and their
respective grandparents, the emotional stability and happiness that the
girls had achieved, their "roots" in their existing environments, and the
emotional turmoil they would have suffered if taken from the only
homes they had ever known. In short, as between equally "fit" custodi-
ans, custody was awarded to the longtime substitute parents to protect
the girls' happiness and emotional well-being and to preserve the con-
tinuity of their relationships with longtime custodians who had pro-
vided them affection and a sense of stability. This sensitivity for the
psychological and emotional needs of children is also evident in all of
the other pre-1973 Maryland cases that awarded custody to someone
other than a biological parent.' 2
2
Because of these attitudes, one might have predicted that the psy-
chological parent concept would receive favorable treatment when first
argued to a Maryland appellate court. However, in Ross v. Hoffman, 1 23
the only case to date in which the Court of Appeals has had an oppor-
tunity to respond, the court mentioned the doctrine only in a footnote
and did not indicate the extent to which it should or should not become
a part of Maryland law. The Court of Special Appeals, however, has
left no uncertainty concerning its attitude toward the merits of prefer-
ring psychological parents over biological parents. In Montgomery
County Department of Social Services v. Sanders,124 a three judge panel
expressly refused to use the concept of the psychological parent as "the
120. Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 119, 43 A.2d 186, 192-93 (1945).
121. Trenton v. Christ, 216 Md. 418, 140 A.2d 660 (1958); Piotrowski v. State, 179 Md.
377, 18 A.2d 199 (1941).
122. See supra cases cited notes 77-97.
123. 280 Md. 172, 193 n.7, 372 A.2d 582, 594 n.7 (1977).
124. 38 Md. App. 406, 381 A.2d 1154 (1977). In Powers v. Hadden, 30 Md. App. 577,
590-92, 353 A.2d 641, 649-50 (1976), (Davidson, J., dissenting), Judge Davidson would have
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test" for resolving a custody dispute between a young boy's mother and
his substitute parents.
The facts involved in Sanders are worth noting. When the boy
was ten months old, his mother took him to a hospital for treatment of
a suspected infection, only to be told that his "shocking physical condi-
tion" was due to numerous physical injuries including broken bones,
bruises, scratches, and a bite mark, all of which suggested that the in-
fant had been physically abused.' 25 The Montgomery County Depart-
ment of Social Services (hereinafter MCDSS) filed a petition to have
the boy declared to be a "Child in Need of Assistance," and at an
emergency hearing held three weeks after he was first taken to the hos-
pital, the court ordered that he be removed from his parent's custody
and committed to the MCDSS for "temporary" shelter care. 126 Very
shortly thereafter, he was placed with the foster parents who subse-
quently asked for permanent custody.
At two subsequent hearings, the evidence indicated that the
mother was not responsible for the boy's physical injuries and that they
were probably caused by his father's "rough play" and misguided at-
tempts at discipline.' 27 Although she was not found to be at fault, the
mother voluntarily engaged in a number of activities that suggested she
was attempting to become a better parent. For instance, she partici-
pated in a therapy program, took a course on child development,
worked with young children in the Sunday school at her church, and
took a number of steps to create a better environment for her son. 28
Althpugh limited finances prevented travelling from Ohio to visit her
son in Maryland, there was some indication that she made frequent
telephone calls to inquire about him. And then, nine months after her
son had been placed with foster parents, she filed a petition asking that
he be returned to her. Several months later, when the child had been
living with his foster parents for approximately eighteen months, the
mother's request was granted.
These facts are worth noting because Sanders is one of the few
Maryland cases in which it was almost certain that the biological par-
ent would win tf the court retained Maryland's traditional parental pre-
sumption, but would lose Kf the court adopted the psychological parent
used the psychological parent doctrine as the basis for awarding custody to the substitute
parents.
125. 38 Md. App. at 408, 381 A.2d at 1157.
126. Id. at 408-09, 381 A.2d at 1157.
127. Id. at 409, 381 A.2d at 1157.
128. There was testimony that she was "capable of putting her newly acquired knowledge
on child rearing into practice." Id. at 410-11, 381 A.2d at 1158.
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doctrine. As the Court of Special Appeals noted, Maryland law tradi-
tionally presumed that the child's best interests dictate awarding cus-
tody to a biological parent unless "the parent is unfit to have custody,
or. . .there are such exceptional circumstances as make such custody
detrimental to the best interest of the child."' 29 In Sanders, the mother
had not abandoned the child and there was no evidence that she had
abused him or that she was guilty of any other misconduct making her
"unfit."' 3 ° In fact, she had made bona fide efforts to become a better
parent and had sought to reacquire custody as soon as she felt capable
of providing a proper home. 3' And although the boy and his mother
had been separated for eighteen months, neither the trial court nor the
Court of Special Appeals considered this an "exceptional circum-
stance" making custody in the mother detrimental to the boy's best
interests. 32
On the other hand, had the Court of Special Appeals adopted the
psychological parent doctrine, it almost certainly would have awarded
custody to the foster parents. First: The boy was only ten months old
when custody was transferred from his mother to the foster parents.
Considering his "sense of time" at that age, it is likely that he had
ceased to view his biological mother as his psychological parent some
time before eighteen months had passed. 33 Second: The record sug-
gested that a relationship of mutual affection had developed between
him and his foster parents, that they had fulfilled his emotional and
physical needs on a day-to-day basis, and that he felt wanted and loved
by them. 134 They therefore had become his "psychological parents." 
35
Third: When the final review hearings were held on the mother's peti-
tion, the boy was approximately two and one-half years old, and at that
age children have a very strong need for continuity in their relation-
ships with the adults who have been fulfilling their physical and emo-
tional needs - particularly in a case such as Sanders, where the child
had previously experienced a separation from his mother, the adult
who was his first "psychological parent."''
36
129. Id. at 416, 381 A.2d at 1161.
130. Id. at 424, 381 A.2d at 1165.
131. Id. at 410-11, 381 A.2d at 1158.
132. See id. at 421-23, 381 A.2d at 1163-64.
133. See BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 99, at 40-42.
134. See id. at 17-21.
135. See id.
136. "Where continuity of such relationships is interrupted more than once, as happens
due to multiple placements in the early years, the children's emotional attachments become
increasingly shallow and indiscriminate. They tend to grow up as persons who lack warmth
in their contacts with fellow beings." Id. at 33.
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Because custody would have been awarded to the foster parents if
the court had accepted the psychological parent doctrine, Sanders was
a good test case. The Court of Special Appeals decided that psycholog-
ical parent status ought not to be determinative.' 37 The court began by
stressing the importance of a biological parent's right to the custody of
his or her own children, describing this right as being "essential," one
of the "basic civil rights of man," and "far more precious . . . than
property rights."'138 The court then rejected MCDSS's argument that
no biological parent could remain the psychological parent of a child
under five once they have been separated for at least six months, and
that no such child should ever be returned to his biological parents if
others have become his psychological parents. 139 The court maintained
that no pre-established time period should operate to deprive biological
parents of custody: "The intricacies of the many human relationships
that are interwoven into each custody dispute defy [such] simplification
S.... 140 Emphasizing that the law must leave room for adjustments
in individual cases, the court concluded that judges must be free to
consider all relevant circumstances and should not focus on any one
factor, such as the length of time that a parent and child have been
separated.' 41 The court also suggested that "unrestrained application"
of a time formula could lead to "absurd results," such as awarding cus-
tody to kidnappers if they have kept the child long enough to become
its pscyhological parents. 142 Moreover, a time formula might en-
courage even consciencious substitute parents to abscond with a child
in order to create "squatter's rights."' m43 And finally, the court ex-
pressed a clear disinclination to adopt any rule that would give undue
weight to the testimony of psychologists, psychiatrists, and social work-
ers. Such experts "'sometimes develop 'rescue fantasies' . . . [that]
tend to obscure objective evaluations of the strengths of the child's own
home,'"'14 and routine reliance upon such experts "could lead the
courts, in acts of misapplied psychology, to separate unjustly family
members." 14
137. Montgomery County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 408, 381
A.2d 1154, 1157 (1977).
138. Id. at 414, 381 A.2d at 1160.
139. Id. at 414, 381 A.2d at 1159.
140. Id. at 421, 381 A.2d at 1164.
141. Id. at 420-21, 381 A.2d at 1163.
142. Id. at 422, 381 A.2d at 1164.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 424, 381 A.2d at 1165 (quoting Thomas, ChildAbuse and Neglect Part P" His-
torical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspective, 50 N.C.L. REV. 293, 347 (1972)).
145. Id. at 423, 381 A.2d at 1165.
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The court's rather cavalier response to the role of psychologists,
psychiatrists, and social workers was unfortunate. All judges are not
incapable of making objective evaluations merely because some may
react emotionally to a particular custody case. Similarly, all psycholo-
gists, psychiatrists, and social workers are not incapable of making ob-
jective evaluations that accurately identify a child's emotional
problems and needs just because some of them may sometimes develop
"rescue fantasies."
It is a bit more difficult to respond to the Court of Special Appeal's
objection to the use of a pre-established time period that resolves dis-
putes in favor of substitute parents once they have had custody for the
prescribed length of time. In fact, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child
did not advocate the use of any specific time period because "[t]he pro-
cess through which a new child-parent status emerges is too complex
and subject to too many individual variations for the law to provide a
rigid statutory timetable."'" However, in 1979, two years after Sand-
ers was decided, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit reluctantly concluded
that specific time periods should be established because of the difficulty
of proving something as subjective as a child's mental attitude concern-
ing who his psychological parents are. 147 They noted that such a deter-
mination requires many sessions between the child and a properly
qualified clinician and that such sessions are likely to be intrusive to the
child and create intolerable periods of uncertainty and delay. 48 There-
fore they concluded:
We propose the following statutory periods during which a
child is in the direct and continuous care of the same adult(s) as
maximum intervals beyond which it would be unreasonable to
presume that a child's residual ties with his absent parents are
more significant than those that have developed between him and
his longtime caretakers:
(a) 12 months for a child up to the age of 3 years at the time
of placement; [i.e., at the time the child was first placed with
the "longtime caretakers" who are claiming to be the child's
psychological parents];
(b) 24 months for a child from the age of 3 years at the time
of placement.
...[Tihese time spans coupled with the longtime caretaker's wish
146. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 99, at 48.
147. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
42-45 (1979) [hereinafter cited as BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS].
148. Id. at 43-44.
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to continue custody are reliable indicators for granting legal recog-
nition to the "new" relationships and for terminating the legal re-
lationship between the children [and] absent parents ... 149
The only exception to these time period rules is for children in the older
age group. Since "some older children may hold emotional attach-
ments to absent parents all the more fiercely and possessively the
longer the separation lasts," a special hearing should be held for any
child over the age of five,
(a) who, at the time of placement, had been in the continu-
ous care of his parents for not less than the 3 preceding years;
and
(b) who had not been separated from his parents because
they inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily injury
upon him or where convicted of a sexual offense against him.
Drawing upon the best available professional personnel, and rec-
ognizing the limits of such inquiries, the [decisionmaker] would
determine whether the child's absent parents are still his psycho-
logical parents and whether his return to them would be the least
detrimental alternative. In the event that such evidence is incon-
clusive, the child's relationship to his longtime caretakers should
be given legal recognition. '5 0
t Although these time periods are subject to the same objections that
the Court of Special Appeals made in Sanders, today a Maryland court
might be less inclined to reject them because they are significantly
longer than the six-month period that provoked such a negative re-
sponse in Sanders. They are long enough to enable an adult to appreci-
ate the probability that a one- or two-year old child will form a very
strong attachment to any person who has continuously fulfilled the
child's physicial and psychological needs on a day-to-day basis for at
least one year (i.e., for at least one-half of the child's life). Similarly, an
adult should recognize the probability that the same thing is true for a
child three years of age or older who has received such care for at least
two years. Moreover, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit have added a sig-
nificant element of flexibility to their proposed timetable by providing
an exception for children who are over the age of five when first placed
with substitute parents.
149. Id. at 46. If these statutory periods had been used in Montgomery County Dep't of
Social Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 381 A.2d 1154 (1977), discussed at text accompa-
nying notes 124-36 supra, custody would have been awarded to the foster parents. The boy
was less than three years old when first placed with foster parents, he was in their direct and
continuous care for at least twelve months, and they wanted to retain custody.
150. BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, upra note 147, at 47-48.
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However, even if a Maryland court might be more inclined today
to adopt these significantly longer time periods, we should consider the
other objections raised in Sanders before deciding whether Maryland
ought to adopt the psychological parent doctrine. The Court of Special
Appeals feared that adoption of this doctrine might create an incentive
for substitute parents to abscond with the child and then petition for
custody after they have become his or her "psychological parents. '"'5
The court was right when it said that this is a more realistic danger than
the unlikely possibility that "the average youngster will be carried off
by kidnappers or gypsies."' 2 But it does not necessarily follow that
this problem justifies the court's refusal to adopt the psychological par-
ent doctrine as "the test." If furthering the specfic child's best interests
is the goal to be achieved, then custody arguably should be awarded to
the persons who have infact become this child's "parents" even if they
wrongfully prevented the child from having contact with his or her bio-
logical parents. After all, Maryland cases have stressed that the pur-
pose of custody litigation is not to punish adults; it is to further the
child's best interests. 53
On the other hand, perhaps a specific child's best interests are most
likely to be protected if the law is structured to discourage adults from
engaging in conduct likely to destroy the relationship between a child
and a biological parent, who usually is also the child's psychological
parent. 54 According to Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, the mere
physical fact of separation does not automatically destroy a child's per-
ception concerning who his psychological parents are, nor does the
mere physical fact of "moving in" with others automatically create a
new psychological parent-child relationship. A child continues to iden-
tify psychological parents as such until others, on a "day-to-day basis,
through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality," have
created in the child a sense of being "wanted" and have fulfilled the
child's physical and psychological needs, thereby becoming the child's
new "psychological parents."' 5 5  Prior to that time, the relationship
that ordinarily should be preserved, if possible, is that which still exists
in the child's mind and heart.5 6 If this is so, it follows that the law
151. Montgomery County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 422, 381
A.2d 1154, 1164 (1977).
152. Id.
153. Eg., Raible v. Raible, 242 Md. 586, 594, 219 A.2d 777, 780 (1966); Hild v. Hild, 221
Md. 349, 358, 157 A.2d 442, 447 (1960).
154. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 99, at 19, makes it clear that "biological"
parents also can be, and often are, "psychological" parents.




should be structured to encourage attempts to reunite children with
their biological-psychological parents and to discourage unreasonable
attempts. to weaken this relationship, at least until after the prior rela-
tionship has been replaced by a new one.
In Sanders the Court of Special Appeals reasoned that adoption of
the psychological parent concept might encourage substitute parents to
be unreasonably destructive of the relationship between the child and
his or her biological parents - that as the new relationship grows into
one involving strong mutual attachment and affection, the substitute
parents may be tempted to insulate the child unreasonably from con-
tact with the biological parents until the relevant time period has
elapsed and they have acquired "squatter's rights."' 57 While this may
be true, it is just as possible that the psychological parent doctrine
might encourage biological parents to make every effort to bring about
a reunion with their child as quickly as possible in order toprevent the
custodians from acquiring "rights" in "their" child.
The traditional presumption favoring biological parents might af-
fect behavior in the same way. If substitute parents have strong feel-
ings for the child, the knowledge that the law does not favor them
might prompt increased efforts to prevent the child from being reunited
with his or her biological parents. At the same time, once biological
parents know that the law favors them, this knowledge might give them
added hope for success and act as an incentive to increase their efforts
to be reunited with their child. Thus, either rule of law might act as an
incentive to behavior that should be discouraged and to behavior that
should be encouraged. It is not clear that one rule is better in this re-
spect than the other. In fact, other factors are likely to have a greater
effect on behavior than whether Maryland uses the psychological par-
ent doctrine or the traditional presumption favoring biological parents
- for instance, the extent to which a child is loved and the extent to
which one or more of the adults involved has come to view the custody
dispute as an attack on his or her rights or a threat to his or her ego.
Citing a series of Supreme Court cases that spoke of biological
parents' constitutional rights against arbitrary state interference with
the family, the Sanders court also suggested that the psychological par-
ent doctrine disregards the "rights" of biological parents. 58 In Smith v.
Organization of Foster Familiesfor Equality & Reform,' 59 decided after
Sanders, the Supreme Court suggested in dicta that foster families, like
157. Montgomery County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 422-23, 381
A.2d 1154, 1164 (1977).
158. Id. at 414, 381 A.2d at 1160.
159. 431 U.S. 816, 843-44 (1977).
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biological families, may have liberty interests that are entitled to consti-
tutional protection. However, the Supreme Court has never been faced
with the problem of determining whose "rights" are superior - those
of biological or of substitute parents. 60
The Supreme Court thus has provided no guidance to states choos-
ing whether to use a presumption favoring either biological or psycho-
logical parents in custody disputes between the two. 16  Of course, a
state has an alternative to both of these approaches. It can renounce all
presumptions and direct judges to decide each dispute in light of its
unique circumstances, remembering always that the court's goal should
be to further the child's welfare, not the adults' "rights."
The latter is the best approach. Maryland should avoid all arbi-
trary rules because they improperly limit the decisionmaker's discre-
tion. Each person involved in a custody dispute - the child, the
biological parent or parents, and the substitute parent or parents - is a
complex individual whose emotional, intellectual, and physical needs
and capabilities are unique. In addition, the environments in which the
competing claimants live are likely to be different in ways that will af-
fect the child's welfare. A court must be free to consider all of these
factors and to evaluate their effects on the individual child's welfare. If
custody is awarded because a claimant is a biological or a psychological
parent, these other important factors will not be considered and the
court will have insufficient discretion to be as responsive as possible to
the unique needs of each child involved in a custody battle. As the
Court of Special Appeals said in Sanders, "[t]he intricacies of the many
human relationships that are interwoven into each custody dispute defy
[such] simplification . . . . [There must be] room for adjustments to
individual situations."1 62
Thus we should encourage decisionmakers to consider all circum-
stances that might affect the child's welfare, and to give them sufficient
discretion to do so effectively, we must reject any rule that isolates one
factor and makes it controlling or uses it as the basis for a presumption.
All presumptions should be discarded.
160. See Curtis, The Psychological Parent Doctrine in Custody Disputes Between Foster
Parents and Biological Parents, 16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 149, 157-72 (1980).
161. See id. But see Muench & Levy, PsychologicalParentage." 4 NaturalRight, 13 FAM.
L.Q. 129 (1979), in which the authors argue that foster children ought to have a substantive
due process right to remain with their psychological parents and that the Supreme Court
seems to be moving toward recognition of such a right.
162. Montgomery County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 421, 381
A.2d 1154, 1164 (1977).
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II. CONSIDERATIONS FOR A PROPER APPLICATION OF THE BEST
INTERESTS STANDARD
A. "Joint Custody"
Our first task is to define "joint custody." A particular decree is
clearly a joint custody decree if it provides that (1) the parents will
share equally the authority and responsibility for making decisions that
significantly affect the welfare of their child; and (2) the child is to live
with each of them on an equal or split time basis - for example, alter-
nating weeks with each parent, or school days with one parent and
weekends and most vacation days with the other."63 "Joint custody,"
however, also has been used as a descriptive label for arrangements in
which only one of these two parental responsibilities is shared.'64 This
usage has prompted some critics to suggest that this label not be used at
all, 16 5 or at least not "when physical or actual custody is lodged prima-
rily in [only] one parent."' 66 However, this label ought to be used for
both of the situations described above. Two very important parenting
functions are involved - providing a home for the child and making
decisions concerning the child's welfare. If either function is being
shared by both parents, then they are both "custodians" in the sense
that they are functioning as parents, are actively involved in the child's
life, and are responsible for his or her welfare. The label "joint cus-
tody" is therefore appropriate because it suggests to the parents, to the
child, and to others that both parents are continuing to act as responsi-
ble parents even though they no longer live together as husband and
wife. 167
It is unclear whether a joint custody award, as defined above,
would be affirmed today by either of Maryland's appellate courts, be-
cause there is very little Maryland authority in point. In 1934, the
Court of Appeals said that what today is called joint custody "is to be
avoided, whenever possible, as an evil fruitful in the destruction of dis-
163. Zima, Custody: A Realistic Approach, 2 FAM. L. REV. 27, 27 (1979). For a good
discussion of how the child's time might be divided between the parents, see Miller, Joint
Custody, 13 FAM. L.Q. 345, 388-90, 394 (1979); Woolley, Shared Custody, 1 FAM. ADVOC. 6
(Summer 1978).
164. See, e.g., Dodd v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 644, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 403 (Sup. Ct. 1978)
and cases cited therein.
165. Paryne & Boyle, Divided Opinions on Joint Custody, 2 FAM. L. REV. 163, 166 (1979).
166. Dodd v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 645, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 403 (Sup. Ct. 1978); see also
Miller, supra note 163, at 360 n. 79, listing fifteen different labels used for alternatives to sole
custody. Mr. Miller recommends "joint legal custody" for shared decisionmaking, and
"joint physical custody" for shared residence.
167. See Haddad & Roman, No-Fault Custody, 2 FAM. L. REV. 95, 100 (1979), which uses
"joint custody" to describe a sharing of either of the two functions discussed in text.
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cipline, in the creation of distrust, and in the production of mental dis-
tress in the child."' 68 And in another case from the 1930's, the court
said that it was not "wise to impair the authority and control of the
[children's paternal grandmother who had been their custodian,] by di-
viding it with [the mother] whose place [had] been taken by the custo-
dian." 169 Although both cases express distaste for joint custody, 170
neither is very persuasive. Joint custody was not an issue in the second
case, 17 and in the first, the court merely declared that joint custody
would produce the evil effects listed, without explaining how or why.
Today, a Maryland court should evaluate arguments both for and
against joint custody before deciding whether to follow dicta in one
case and an unexplained denunciation in another.
The Maryland Code, however, arguably precludes an award of
joint custody because article 72A, section 1, provides: "Where the par-
ents live apart, the court may award the guardianship of the child to
either of them .... ,,172 This language suggests an award to either the
mother or the father, not to both. This interpretation is plausible, how-
ever, only if the remainder of the sentence is ignored. The sentence
concludes: "but, in any custody proceeding, neither parent shall be
given preference solely because of his or her sex."'173 Read as a whole,
the sentence deals with whether a parent's sex should be relevant when
both are requesting custody, not with joint versus sole custody.
The conclusion that article 72A, section 1, does not prohibit joint
custody awards in Maryland is supported by other provisions in this
statute:
The father and mother are the1oint natura/guardians of their child
168. McCann v. McCann, 167 Md. 167, 172, 173 A. 7, 9 (1934).
169. Maddox v. Maddox, 174 Md. 470, 477, 199 A. 507, 510 (1938).
170. The only other Maryland case that might be interpreted to express an opinion on
joint custody is Sullivan v. Auslaender, 12 Md. App. 1, 276 A.2d 698 (1971). The parents
had agreed that the children would live with the father in Israel for three years, then with the
mother in Maryland for three years. The Court of Special Appeals reversed a circuit court
decree incorporating this agreement, and instead awarded sole custody to the mother. How-
ever, the court did not reverse specifically because it opposed joint custody decrees. The
court was concerned about losing control over the children if they lived in Israel, feared that
moving them from one country to another at the end of three years might cause too severe a
disruption in their lives, and gave some weight to the children's desire to remain with their
mother.
171. In Maddox v. Maddox, 174 Md. 470, 199 A. 507 (1938), the trial court had ordered
that the children be placed in an institution and that the mother and the paternal grand-
mother have visitation rights. The issue on appeal was whether the children should live in
the institution, with their grandmother, or with their mother, and not whether the mother
and grandmother should have joint custody.
172. MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (1978) (emphasis added).
173. Id. (emphasis added).
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under eighteen years of age and are jointly and severally charged
with its support, care, nurture, welfare and education. They shall
have equalpowers and duties, and neitherparent has any right supe-
rior to the right of the other concerning the child's custody ...
Provided: The provisions of this article shall not be deemed to
affect the existing law relative to the appointment of a third person
as guardian of the person of the minor where the parents are un-
suitable, or the child's interest would be adversely affected by re-
maining under the natural guardianship of itsparent orparents.74
Although the legislature did not use the term "joint custody," the plain
meaning of the italicized words is that both parents have equal rights
and duties concerning guardianship or custody because they are their
minor child's "joint natural guardians." A decree that awards "joint
custody" to both parents clearly is consistent with this legislative decla-
ration that parents are - and should be treated as - "joint natural
guardians."' 75
The only other relevant statutes provide simply that an equity
court may "[d]irect who shall have the custody or guardianship of a
child,"' 76 and that an agreement between parents concerning custody
may be enforced by a court, either with or without modification, de-
pending upon whether the court concludes that modification is neces-
sary to protect the child's best interests. 77 These two statutes do not
expressly prohibit joint custody; indeed, in the first statute, the un-
restricted use of the word "who" and, in the second statute, the absence
of any specific provision prohibiting enforcement of an agreement pro-
viding for joint custody, seem to give the courts broad authority to
make whatever custody award is in the child's best interests. The lan-
guage of these statutes coupled with that of article 72A, section 1, indi-
cates that a Maryland court has the authority to award joint custody,
and should do so if such an award is in the child's best interests.
Because a Maryland court's statutory authority is broad enough to
include authority to award joint custody, we should examine the argu-
ments for and against joint custody to determine whether the Court of
Appeals ought to reject its earlier denunciation of such awards.1 78
In Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, Joseph Goldstein, Anna
Freud, and Albert Solnit claim that:
174. Id. (emphasis added).
175. There are no Maryland appellate cases in point.
176. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-602(a)(1) (Supp. 1981); see also MD. ANN.
CODE art. 16, § 25 (1981).
177. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 28 (1981).
178. See supra cases cited notes 168-69.
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Children have difficulty in relating positively to, profiting from,
and maintaining the contact with two psychological parents who
are not in positive contact with each other. Loyalty conflicts are
common and normal under such conditions and may have devas-
tating consequences by destroying the child's positive relationships
to both parents. 7 9
Because of these serious adverse effects and the value of protecting the
security and continuity of the relationship between the child and at
least one psychological parent,18 the authors are not only opposed to
joint custody, but also assert that "the noncustodial parent should have
no legally enforceable right to visit the child, and the custodial parent
should have the right to decide whether it is desirable for the child to
have such visits."' 8'
Other critics agree that joint custody is undesirable, but would not
necessarily preclude a noncustodial parent from visiting his or her child
or give the custodial parent authority over visitation. These critics ar-
gue that joint custody may create chaos. ' 82 They contend that moving
the child back and forth between two houses, and differences in disci-
pline and home life, may create confusion and instability for the
child, 8 may significantly increase the child's opportunities to play one
parent against the other in order to gain favors or weaken discipline,' 84
and may provide the parents with additional reasons to argue with each
other. 185 It has also been claimed that "the requirements of joint cus-
tody are inherently contrary to the fact of the divorce."'186 Divorce oc-
curs because the parents are incompatible to some extent; thus, they are
likely to be resentful, even hostile, and unlikely to be able to achieve
the degree of cooperation necessary to be joint custodians. 87 Oppo-
nents of joint custody also argue that a child who has experienced the
trauma of witnessing his parent's relationship deteriorate, needs a feel-
ing of certainty and finality concerning his own relationship with them.
179. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 99, at 38; see also id. at 12.
180. 1d. at 31-35.
181. Id. at 38.
182. Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 587, 407 N.Y.S.2d 449, 451, 378 N.E.2d 1019,
1021 (1978). For additional cases expressing opposition to joint custody, see, e.g., Hbley v.
Holley, 158 So. 2d 620, 622 (La. Ct. App. 1963); Fuhrman v. Fuhrman, 254 N.W.2d 97, 100
(N.D. 1977); In re Marriage of Pergament, 28 Or. App. 459, 462, 559 P.2d 942, 943 (1977);
Lumbra v. Lumbra, 136 Vt. 529, 532, 394 A.2d 1139, 1142 (1978).
183. Miller, supra note 163, at 366-67; Paryne & Boyle, supra note 165, at 167-68.
184. Miller, supra note 163, at 367-68.
185. Id. at 367; Zima, supra note 163, at 27-28.
186. Miller, supra note 163, at 367.
187. Id. at 368; In Reprise, Joint Custody - Does it Always Work?, I CHILDREN'S LEGAL
RTS. J. 32, 33 (Jan./Feb. 1980).
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An award of sole custody to one parent, as opposed to joint custody to
both, provides this sense of certainty and finality because it establishes
a long term relationship with one custodian who is clearly in charge. 18
Finally, these critics have suggested that joint custody may be chosen
by some parents and judges for the wrong reasons - to avoid wound-
ing the feelings of one of the parents, as an easy way for the parents or
a judge to avoid making a hard decision, or as a method for continuing
some relationship between the parents.' 18 9
The proponents of joint custody have responded that joint custody
does not necessarily create chaos or confusion and instability for the
children involved. In a study conducted in the 1970's, all of the joint
custody children interviewed had living spaces in both of their parents'
homes, and each home contained toys and clothes belonging to the
child or children. This kept the children from "living out of suitcases,"
and after an initial period of adjustment, they rarely experienced con-
fusion and came to identify both as stable homes rather than places of
transient residence.190 The same study revealed that several of the fa-
thers involved had very hostile relationships with their ex-wives, but
that joint custody was working because both parents cared for their
children and were able to cooperate when their children's interests were
at stake. 91 Actually, in some cases joint custody has increased the inci-
dence of cooperation between hostile parents, because it "fosters an at-
mosphere of detente rather than hostility."' 92 And, although some
have maintained that joint custody creates loyalty conflicts, joint cus-
tody children interviewed for another study said that they "felt free and
comfortable about loving each parent."' 193
Other responses to the arguments against joint custody are found
in the affirmative arguments supporting such awards. For example, al-
though an award of sole custody to one parent and visitation to the
other may help to create a long term relationship with the custodial
parent, it also may seriously damage the child's relationship with the
other parent. Damage may occur in part because such an award "is an
unambiguous signal to the child that one parent is right and one is
wrong,"' 94 and in part because visits with a noncustodial parent can be
strained and superficial. Moreover, a vengeful custodial parent can
188. Miller, supra note 163, at 367.
189. Id. at 368.
190. Haddad & Roman, supra note 167, at 98-99.
191. Id. To ease tensions and reduce the opportunities for argument, some parents used
the child's schools as a transfer point, rather than using one of the parents' homes.
192. Miller, supra note 163, at 364.
193. Woolley, Shared Custody, 1 FAM. ADVOC. 6, 33 (Summer 1978).
194. Miller, supra note 163, at 355.
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sometimes prevent the other parent from having any meaningful con-
tact with his or her child, and even the child's teachers may be reluctant
to discuss the child's performance at school with someone who is not a
"custodian."' 95 As a result, "even the most caring [noncustodial par-
ent] may despondently lose interest."'' 96
A sole custody award might also damage the child's relationship
with the custodial parent. Giving one parent the full responsibility for
living with and raising one or more children may create enormous bur-
dens for that parent, who now must do what two parents previously
did. The work involved, and the drain on physical and emotional re-
sources, may be so great that the custodian understandably grows to
resent being "trapped." As a result, the children may experience feel-
ings of guilt, sensing that they are a burden to someone they love. 197
The advocates of joint custody also stress the importance of fre-
quent association between a child and both of his or her parents, not
only because a personal relationship with both a male and a female
adult helps a child to mature, but also because studies have shown that
the lack of any meaningful relationship with both parents has serious
adverse effects on a child's emotional well-being. 98 Thus, these advo-
cates argue that joint custody is preferable to sole custody because it
more nearly approximates an intact nuclear family and, therefore, is
more likely to provide "an atmosphere for normal development and a
framework for establishing sound relationships with both parent's."' 99
Several miscellaneous arguments for joint custody also should be
noted. Joint custody arguably is consistent with the trend toward
equality between the sexes, because it may facilitate a mother's pursuit
of goals outside the home and may make fathers more conscious of,
and responsive to, their child rearing responsibilities.2" It also has
been claimed that a parent who is a joint custodian, rather than just a
visitor, is more likely to be satisfied with his or her involvement with
the child, and therefore less likely to use the child as a "'pawn'"1 in
battles with the other parent20' or to default on child support pay-
195. Id. at 356.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 356-57.
198. Haddad & Roman, supra note 167, at 99-100; Miller, supra note 163, at 348-50, 358-
59, 362; Watson, The Children of Armageddon. Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21
SYRACUSE L. REV. 55, 68-69 (1969).
199. Haddad & Roman, supra note 167, at 98. see also Miller, supra note 163, at 363.
200. Miller, supra note 163, at 365.
201. Haddad & Roman, supra note 167, at 99 (quoting Grief, Fathers, Children and Joint




ments.2 °2 Also, when one parent has only visiting rights, saying good-
bye at the conclusion of a visit can be very difficult and emotional for
both the child and the visiting parent because neither is satisfied with
the quality of their time together, and they can look forward to only
more of the same. With joint custody, however, there is less pain for
both parent and child because both know they will be "'living to-
gether'" again soon.2°3 In addition, joint custody has provided some
children with more time and attention from each parent than they re-
ceived when their parents were still together, thereby strengthening the
relationships involved. 204 Finally, because a successful joint custody
arrangement usually is based on an agreement between the parents,
their ability to agree on the major issues of residence and responsibility
for decisionmaking is likely to mean that they will be able to agree on
other less important issues as well. This will add a useful element of
flexibility to the manner in which they discharge their responsibilities
as parents.20 5 For example, as the child's need to be with a particular
parent fluctuates, or as a parent's need to have free time changes, the
parents can easily modify the existing custody arrangement simply by
agreement.2 °6
In addition to evaluating the merits of these arguments for and
against joint custody, a Maryland court determining whether joint cus-
tody should be awarded also ought to consider that joint custody has
worked in some cases,20 7 but not in others.208 Is it possible to identify
the factors that contribute to success or failure? In his very helpful
article, David J. Miller concludes that three conditions must be met if
joint "custody of any sort is going to work, and that six other factors
may be relevant, but are not prerequisites to success. 2 ' The prerequi-
sites are: (1) that both parents are "fit" custodians; (2) that there is
"some degree of cooperation" between the parents, and at least a
"moderate amount of mutual respect and trust";21 and (3) that the par-
ents have some shared values. The factors that are important, but not
202. Miller, supra note 163, at 365.
203. Haddad & Roman, supra note 167, at 99 (1979) (quoting Grief, supra note 201).
204. Miller, supra note 163, at 363. See L. SALK, WHAT EVERY CHILD WOULD LIKE His
PARENTS TO KNOW 177 (1972).
205. For a good checklist of provisions that might be included in a joint custody agree-
ment, see Miller, supra note 163, at 390-93.
206. Id. at 361-62.
207. See, e.g., id. at 385-86.
208. See, e.g., Dodd v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct. 1978); In
Reprise, Joint Custody - Does It Always Work?, 1 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 32, 33
(Jan./Feb. 1980).
209. Miller, supra note 163, at 369-74.
210. Id. at 369.
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essential, are: 211 (1) Both parents must want to be joint custodians.
(2) At least one parent should have a flexible work schedule. (3) If the
child is to live in two homes, they should not provide him or her with
extremely different physical environments; and (4) one home should
not be too far away from the other. (5) If joint custody will create
additional expenses, as is often the case, the parents should be able to
afford the increased cost. (6) The number of children involved, and
their ages, may be important, but the authorities are so widely divided
as to the significance of these factors that it "is impossible to reach even
tentative conclusions" until there has been more experience with joint
custody.212 Although some advocates of joint custody argue that there
must be more than a "moderate" amount of cooperation and congeni-
ality between the parents,213 and that joint custody should be awarded
only if both parents consent,2' 4 these arguments reflect disagreement
only as to how important these particular factors are, not whether they
are important. If a judge considers all nine factors in each case, he or
she ought to have a sound basis for predicting whether joint custody is
likely to succeed or fail.
What conclusions should a Maryland court reach concerning joint
custody? First, if such an award is in a child's best interests, the rele-
vant provisions in the Maryland Code are broad enough to permit such
a decree.21 5 Second, when evaluating the arguments for and against
joint custody, a Maryland court should also consider that it has worked
in some cases, but not in others, and that the nine factors identified by
Mr. Miller seem to be the keys to success or failure.2' 6 In some specific
cases, the dire predictions of the opponents of joint custody can come
true; joint custody may create confusion, instability for the child, loy-
alty conflicts, additional arguments between hostile parents, and so
forth. However, in other specific cases the advocates of joint custody
will be right; if joint custody is awarded the child may maintain a more
stable and loving relationship with both parents, both parents may be
more satisified with their involvement with the child, the child may be
happier and experience less emotional upset, and so forth. Because
joint custody will not work in all cases, there should be no presumption
211. Id. at 370-74.
212. Id. at 374.
213. E.g., Zima, supra note 163, at 28; In Reprise, supra note 208.
214. Eg., Zima, supra note 163, at 28.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 172-77. However, since joint custody is still a
relatively new concept, and might be viewed by some judges and lawyers as too "novel" or
"experimental" to be tried, it might be wise to enact a statute declaring that joint custody
may be awarded when in the child's best interests.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 207-12.
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favoring such awards.2 7 However, because joint custody will work in
some cases and is more likely to further some children's best interests
than is an award of sole custody with visitation rights, a Maryland
court should at least consider joint custody in all cases where child cus-
tody is in issue.2t 8
B. Custody and Visitation for Grandparents
In Burns v. Bines,2 19 the Court of Appeals said that
"[g]randparents have no 'right' to custody; . . . they unfortunately
have only burdens and responsibilities which they assume on account
of the parent's misconduct or misfortune." It makes little practical dif-
ference, however, whether the courts speak in terms of "rights," be-
cause custody has been awarded to grandparents when they overcame
the parental presumption and demonstrated that the child's best inter-
ests were served by awarding them custody.2 °
Maryland cases also make it clear that a court can award visitation
to grandparents. For example, in Powers v. Hadden,22' a circuit court
had decided that it would be in the child's best interests to live with her
father, but since he was in the military service, the court awarded cus-
tody to the paternal grandparents, with visitation rights reserved for the
mother and the maternal grandparents. Approximately two years later,
the court concluded that circumstances had changed significantly so
that it was in the child's best interests for custody to be transferred to
the mother, with visitation rights reserved for the father and the pater-
nal grandparents. In reviewing the decree, the Court of Special Ap-
peals did not question whether grandparents ought to have "rights"
concerning visitation, or whether the court had the authority to make
such awards.222 The court's only concern was the child's best
interests.223
217. Paryne & Boyle, supra note 165, at 170.
218. Id; see also sources cited supra notes 190-205, all of which agree that joint custody
ought to at least be considered a possible alternative to sole custody with visitation rights.
219. 189 Md. 157, 164, 55 A.2d 487, 490 (1947).
220. Trenton v. Christ, 216 Md. 418, 140 A.2d 660 (1958); Piotrowski v. State, 179 Md.
377, 18 A.2d 199 (1941). Custody has been denied when grandparents failed to rebut the
parental presumption. Sibley v. Sibley, 187 Md. 358, 50 A.2d 128 (1946); Powers v. Hadden,
30 Md. App. 577, 353 A.2d 641 (1976).
221. 30 Md. App. 577, 353 A.2d 641 (1976).
222. See also Maddox v. Maddox, 174 Md. 470, 475, 199 A. 507, 509 (1938), in which the
Court of Appeals did not question the circuit court's authority to enter a decree providing
that the children's grandmother be permitted to see them.
223. 30 Md. App. 577, 581 &passim, 353 A.2d 641, 643 &passim (1976). Even when a
grandparent does not request visitation, one of the reasons for awarding visitation to a par-
ticular parent may be that the child thereby will be afforded a better opportunity to become
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A recent amendment to the Maryland Code, however, creates sev-
eral problems concerning awards of custody and visitation to grandpar-
ents. Prior to July 1, 1981, section 3-602(a) of Courts and Judicial
Proceedings provided that equity courts had jurisdiction over both cus-
tody and visitation and that they could: "(1) Direct who shall have the
custody or guardianship of a child. . .[and] (4) Determine who shall
have visitation rights to a child. 224 Subsection four was amended by
adding the following sentence:
At any time following the termination of a marriage, the court
may consider a petition for reasonable visitation by one or more of
the grandparents of a natural or adopted child of the parties whose
marriage has been terminated, and may grant such visitation if the
court believes it to be in the best interests of the child.225
Note that subsection one, which deals with custody, was not similarly
amended. Does this failure to add such language to subsection one
mean that Maryland equity courts are to have authority to award visi-
tation, but not custody, to grandparents? Because courts have awarded
custody to grandparents in the past,226 it would be unfortunate if the
legislature, in its zeal to emphasize that courts can award visitation to
grandparents, inadvertently abolished an equity court's authority to
award custody to grandparents.
There are at least two reasons why the Maryland courts are likely
to conclude that the amendment to subsection four has not, by negative
implication, abolished an equity court's authority to award custody to a
grandparent. First, although "custody" and "visitation" are related
topics, they are also significantly different because a child "lives with" a
custodian, but only "visits" a person to whom visitation has been
awarded.227 Because of this difference, and because the amendment
deals only with visitation, the courts may reasonably conclude that the
legislature intended to affect only the law of visitation. Had the legisla-
ture intended to change Maryland's custody law, it would have dealt
with custody specifically.228 Second, the new sentence in subsection
acquainted with that parent's relatives. Eg., Barsallo v. Barsallo, 18 Md. App. 560, 570, 308
A.2d 457, 462 (1973).
224. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-602(a) (Supp. 1981) (emphasis added),
amended by 1981 Md. Laws ch. 276.
225. 1981 Md. Laws ch. 276.
226. See supra cases cited notes 219-21.
227. Because of this difference, visitation rights have been preserved even when the court
has concluded that the right to custody has been "lost." See, e.g., Radford v. Matczuk, 223
Md. 483, 164 A.2d 904 (1960); Piotrowski v. State, 179 Md. 377, 18 A.2d 199 (1941).
228. In DiBlasio v. Kolodner, 233 Md. 512, 197 A.2d 245 (1964), the court used this rea-
soning to interpret MD. ANN. CODE art. 75C, § 9 (1957) (now found at MD. CTS. & JUD.
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four suggests that the legislature intended to support, not destroy, the
interests of grandparents. By declaring that equity courts "may grant
such visitation," the legislature recognized the legitimacy of grandpar-
ents' interests in their grandchildren and acted to insure that the courts
have the authority to assist them when it is necessary and proper to do
so. These words manifest no intent to abolish anything.
The amendment creates another problem that should be consid-
ered - what is the significance of the words, "at any time following the
termination of a marriage, the court may . . .?22 None of the prior
Maryland cases dealing with custody or visitation said anything sug-
gesting that custody or visitation could be awarded to grandparents
only after the marriage between the child's parents had "termi-
nated. 23 ° Indeed, in Maddox v. Maddox,23' the court awarded cus-
tody to the children's paternal grandmother in a proceeding in which
the father's request for a divorce was denied, and in subsequent litiga-
tion, a circuit court entered a decree preserving the grandmother's right
to see the children.232 The Court of Appeals made no comment con-
cerning the fact that the marriage between the parents had not been
legally "terminated" prior to the date of either decree. The new
amendment therefore appears to make Maryland law more restrictive
than it was prior to July 1, 1981.
One might argue that such a restriction on visitation rights is wise.
When the parents and child are still living together and the parents'
marriage is intact, visitation litigation between the parents and grand-
parents might adversely affect the child's feelings for one or the other,
and might weaken the parents' "authority" over the child. However, in
some instances, this restriction might prevent the courts from acting to
further the child's best interests. For instance, cases may arise where,
although the parents' marriage has not "terminated," the child is not
living with them and could benefit from the affection and companion-
ship that visits with the grandparents would provide. There also may
be cases in which the parents ignore requests that they help with the
PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-301(a)(1980)), which specifically abolished actions for "alienation of
affections," but said nothing concerning "criminal conversation." The court admitted that
these two common law torts were closely related, but noted that they were different in that
"criminal conversation" was not actionable unless intercourse had occurred between the
defendant and the plaintiffs wife, whereas intercourse was not required for "alienation of
affections." Since the two torts were "different," the court concluded that the legislature
meant "exactly what it said - no more and no less," 233 Md. at 519, 197 A.2d at 249, and
the plaintiff therefore was allowed to sue for "criminal conversation."
229. 1981 Md. Laws ch. 276 (emphasis added).
230. See supra cases cited notes 219-21.
231. 174 Md. 470, 199 A. 507 (1938).
232. Id. at 475, 199 A. at 509.
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child's school work and the grandparents are willing, if allowed, to tu-
tor the child once a week. In such cases - in fact in all custody and
visitation cases - the courts should have the authority to do whatever
is necessary to protect the child's best interests.
If the legislature does not remove this unfortunate restriction, the
courts should interpret the phrase "termination of a marriage" to mean
any "termination." The legal status of marriage is "terminated" only
by the death of one of the spouses or by a court decree.233 However, a
marriage may in fact "terminate" long before either spouse dies or ob-
tains a court decree. It may in fact "terminate" because of, for exam-
ple, desertion by one spouse, a mutually agreed upon separation, or
irreconcilable differences. If the word "terminated" is interpreted to
include termination in fact as well as in law, then this limitation on the
courts' authority at least will not prevent the courts from awarding visi-
tation to grandparents in cases where the marriage is in fact no longer
functioning as a unit, but has not been legally terminated.
C. The Desires of the Parents and of the Child
If parents voluntarily agree that a particular custody arrangement
is in their child's best interests, their agreement merits careful consider-
ation, particularly if it is based on experience with, and love for, the
child.2 3 ' However, because they are so personally involved and such
agreements often are made during times of emotional stress or while
the parents are attempting to resolve property and money problems,
perhaps it is best to provide, as does Maryland Code article 16, section
28, that:
[W]henever any deed or agreement shall make provision for or in
any manner affect the care, custody, education or maintenance of
any infant child or children of the parties, the court has the right to
modify the deed or agreement in respect to the infants as to the
court may seem proper, looking always to the best interests of the
infants.235
This statute does not mean that parental custody and visitation
233. For an interesting case illustrating the practical significance of the rule that the legal
status of marriage is not "terminated" unless and until one of the parties dies or a court
decree is "officially" granted, see Corte v. Cucchiara, 257 Md. 14, 261 A.2d 775 (1970).
234. "[T]he full authority of the law should stand behind what we know or believe is best
- the development of a custody arrangement by consent of the parties, not by mandate of
the state." Trombetta, Joint Custody.- Recent Research and Overloaded Courtrooms Inspire
New Solutions to Custody Disputes, 19 J. FAM. L. 213, 232 (1981); accord BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS, supra note 99, at 49-50; BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 147, at 31-33.
235. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 28 (1981).
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agreements are to be given little weight or modified routinely; they are
in fact frequently incorporated without modification into divorce de-
crees.23 6 Article 16, section 28, means that the parents' wishes need not
be honored f the court is convinced that enforcement of their agree-
ment will adversely affect the child's best interests.237 It also means
that a "contract" between parents concerning child custody or visita-
tion may not be subject to the normal "contract" rules. For example, in
Slancill v. Stancil,238 a contract between the parents provided that the
mother would have custody of one child, that the father would have
visitation rights, and that he would pay child support and alimony.
When the mother allegedly interfered with the father's visitation rights,
he argued that the breach of her promise concerning visitation barred
her from enforcing his promise concerning alimony. The court re-
sponded that "the chancellor cannot be handcuffed in the exercise of
his duty to act in the best interests of a child by any understanding
between parents," '239 and concluded that when such a contract is incor-
porated into a divorce decree, "the covenants, as a matter ofpublic pol-
icy, cease to be, if they formerly were, mutually dependent, and
therefore, noncompliance with the decree by one party does not consti-
tute a defense to an action to enforce the decree by the other."'"
In addition to considering the parents' wishes concerning custody,
Maryland courts sometimes also consider the child's wishes, giving
thei great "weight if [the child] is of sufficient age and capacity to
form a rational judgment."24 ' The child's desires should be respected,
not, because he or she has any "legal right to decide the question of
custody" 24 2 or because the child is "able to wisely judge what is best for
[his or her] future," 243 but because the child's feelings concerning who
the custodian ought to be are some indication of the strength of his or
her attachment to and affection for the person named.
236. See, e.g., Kemp v. Kemp, 287 Md. 165, 167, 411 A.2d 1028, 1030 (1980); Stancil v.
Stancil, 286 Md. 530, 531, 408 A.2d 1030, 1031 (1979); Coffman v. Hayes, 259 Md. 708, 709,
270 A.2d 808, 809 (1970); see also Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 277, 412 A.2d 396, 397
(1980) (agreement concerning custody and support of husband's step-daughter incorporated
into divorce decree).
237. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Auslaender, 12 Md. App. 1, 276 A.2d 698 (1971). Although
there is no statute in point, the same rule has been applied to an agreement between a parent
and a non-parent. Kartman v. Kartman, 163 Md. 19, 161 A. 269 (1932).
238. 286 Md. 530, 408 A.2d 1030 (1979).
239. Id. at 535, 408 A.2d at 1033.
240. Id. at 533, 408 A.2d at 1032 (emphasis added).
241. Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 353, 86 A.2d 463, 469 (1952); accord Wood v. Wood, 227
Md. 112, 115, 175 A.2d 573, 575 (1961); Mullinix v. Mullinix, 12 Md. App. 402, 412, 278
A.2d 674, 680 (1971).
242. Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 353, 86 A.2d 463, 469 (1952).
243. Trenton v. Christ, 216 Md. 418, 423, 140 A.2d 660, 662 (1958).
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The Maryland courts have identified no specific age at which a
child has sufficient capacity to form a rational judgment, 244 but they are
unlikely to consider a child's preference if he or she is under the age of
nine. 245  And even if the child is of sufficient age and capacity, the
child's preference should be given little or no consideration if it was the
product of improper coaching by one parent.246 For example, in Rad-
ford v. Maczuk,247 an eleven-year-old boy had not seen or heard from
his father for approximately nine years. Although the boy's desire to
have no contact with his father did have some "rational" basis - his
father was a stranger - the court properly refused to honor the boy's
request and concluded that the father's visitation rights should be en-
forced. The court said the boy's wishes were entitled to "slight, if any,
consideration," because "the child has not seen or known his father nor
had an opportunity to make an independent choice based on something
more than what had been imparted to him by others. 248
244. In Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 353, 86 A.2d 463, 469 (1952), the Court of Appeals
specifically refused to adopt a rule that the child's wishes are irrelevant unless he or she is at
least fourteen years old.
A Maryland statute provides that a child who is sixteen years old or older may peti-
tion to amend an existing decree concerning his or her custody, and may do so without a
guardian ad litem or next friend. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 66(g) (1981). When such a
petition is filed, "the court shall hold further hearings and may amend the decree and place
the child in the custody of the parent designated by the child." Id. (emphasis added).. This
statute probably was not intended to make a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old child's prefer-
ence binding on the courts. Its apparent purpose was to allow such a child to file a petition
without using a guardian ad litem or next friend, and to make it clear that the court "shall"
hold a hearing and "may" honor the child's request. The court, not the child, is to be the
decisionmaker, and the statute does not suggest that the best interests standard be replaced
by the child's preference. (There are no appellate cases in point.)
245. A child who was seven years old, Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 359, 157 A.2d 442, 447
(1960), and another who was eight, Parker v. Parker, 222 Md. 69, 75, 158 A.2d 607, 610
(1960), were said to be too young and immature for their preferences to be considered.
However, courts have found nine-year-olds to be sufficiently mature. Wilhelm v. Wilhelm,
214 Md. 80, 84, 133 A.2d 423, 425-26 (1957); Sullivan v. Auslaender, 12 Md. App. 1, 18, 276
A.2d 698, 707 (1971). In other cases, courts considered the wishes of children who were ten
years old or older. Wood v. Wood, 227 Md. 112, 115, 175 A.2d 573, 575 (1961) (age 12);
Trenton v. Christ, 216 Md. 418, 422-23, 140 A.2d 660, 662 (1958) (age 10); Ross v. Pick, 199
Md. 341, 353-54, 86 A.2d 463, 470 (1952) (age I1); Kirstukas v. Kirstukas, 14 Md. App. 190,
199, 286 A.2d 535, 539-40 (1972) (age 10); Mullinix v. Mullinix, 12 Md. App. 402, 412, 278
A.2d 674, 680 (1971) (ages 12, 14 and 15).
246. Wallis v. Wallis, 235 Md. 33, 37, 200 A.2d 164, 166 (1964).
247. 223 Md. 483, 164 A.2d 904 (1960).
248. Id. at 491, 164 A.2d at 909. For a good discussion of the problem of coaching, and
of the other problems involved when a court decides to consider a child's wishes concerning
custody - from a judge's point of view, see Newman & Collester, Children Should Be Seen
and Heard, 2 FAM. ADVOC. 8 (Spring 1980).
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D. Facts Concerning the Child or a Potential Custodian
Any fact concerning the child should be considered if relevant to
the child's well-being. If the child has been nervous and upset or his
school attendance has been irregular and his progress unsatisfactory,
these facts suggest that it might not be in the child's best interests to
continue living with the current custodian.24 9 Likewise, the court may
properly consider that the child has been happy and well adjusted or
has made good progress in school while living with a particular custo-
dian.250 In addition, the child's physical health should also be consid-
ered. If a particular custodian neglected the child when the child was
ill,251 or one potential custodian is better able to provide close attention
to the care of a child whose health requires such care,252 these matters
are clearly relevant.
Similar circumstances concerning a potential custodian may be
equally important. If a claimant is or has been mentally ill, 253 is "tem-
peramental" and "highstrung,"254 or is physically disabled,255 these
facts may be relevant, but should not be decisive. They do not preclude
an award when a weighing of all circumstances indicates that it is in the
child's best interests to live with that claimant.2 56  Finally, although
there are no Maryland appellate cases in which a parent known to have
beaten the child involved was nevertheless awarded custody, it clearly
ought to be difficult for such a parent to succeed. 57
249. Palmer v. Palmer, 238 Md. 327, 330, 207 A.2d 481, 483 (1965) (mother ignored re-
quests for help with child's problems in school); Parker v. Parker, 222 Md. 69, 72-73, 158
A.2d 607, 608 (1960).
250. Trenton v. Christ, 216 Md. 418, 422, 140 A.2d 660, 662 (1958); Piotrowski v. State,
179 Md. 377, 383, 18 A.2d 199, 201 (1941).
251. Lippy v. Breidenstein, 249 Md. 415, 417, 240 A.2d 251, 252 (1968); see also
DeGrange v. Kline, 254 Md. 240, 242, 254 A.2d 353, 354 (1969) (child's health improved
after father left him with substitute parents); Levitsky v. Levitsky, 231 Md. 388, 392, 190
A.2d 621, 623 (1963) (mother refused blood transfusion for child).
252. Kauten v. Kauten, 257 Md. 10, 12, 261 A.2d 759, 761 (1970).
253. Wood v. Wood, 227 Md. 112, 114, 175 A.2d 573, 574 (1961); Alden v. Alden, 226
Md. 622, 623, 174 A.2d 793, 793 (1961). In both Wood and Alden, it is difficult to determine
whether the parent's mental illness actually affected the child's welfare. If it had no actual
effect, it should have been ignored. See infra text accompanying notes 265-68.
254. Andrews v. Andrews, 242 Md. 143, 154, 218 A.2d 194, 201 (1966).
255. Palmer v. Palmer, 238 Md. 327, 332, 207 A.2d 481, 484 (1965).
256. In Palmer v. Palmer, 238 Md. 327, 207 A.2d 481 (1965), custody was awarded to a
father who was paraplegic, and in Alden v. Alden, 226 Md. 622, 174 A.2d 793 (1961), cus-
tody was awarded to a mother notwithstanding her previous fourteen months of hospitaliza-
tion for schizophrenia.
257. In Lippy v. Breidenstein, 249 Md. 415, 417, 240 A.2d 251, 252 (1968), the court
mentioned the father's previous neglect in support of a prior removal of the child from his
custody. However, in McClary v. Follett, 226 Md. 436, 442, 174 A.2d 66, 69 (1961), the court
concluded that the father was not "unfit" to have custody of his son merely because he once
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Other forms of parental "misconduct" also may be relevant. Ma-
ryland courts have considered: a parent's frequent, long visits to tav-
erns, often late at night;25 frequent intoxication;259 low "ethical and
moral standards"; 26° mendacity; 26 1 arrests for physically abusing the
other parent;262 criminal conduct for which the parent has been prose-
cuted and convicted; 263 and, improper interference with the other par-
ent's rights to visit the child.264 However, it is important to note that
these circumstances were not considered in a vacuum. In all of these
cases, numerous circumstances were involved; all were considered, yet
no single circumstance was said to be controlling.
Furthermore, the conduct or character of a potential custodian,
and his or her physical or mental attributes, should be relevant only to
the extent that they have had, or will have, some actual effect on the
child's welfare. Andrews v. Andrews,26 5 illustrates this point. Shortly
after a court awarded custody of ten- and twelve-year-old boys to their
father, the mother petitioned for a change of custody, arguing that the
father was unfit because of his interest in, and collection of, what the
hit his step-daughter. The mother apparently considered this "isolated incident" insignifi-
cant because, when mother and step-father separated four years later, she asked him to take
custody of her daughter.
In Montgomery County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 381
A.2d 1154 (1977), the custody of a child who had been either beaten or seriously mishan-
dled, was awarded to his mother. Although the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the
mother was not responsible for the boy's deplorable physical condition, this case is dis-
turbing because the court does not adequately discuss the possibility that the mother may
have knowingly overlooked possible abuse or mishandling by the father.
258. Palmer v. Palmer, 238 Md. 327, 330, 207 A.2d 481, 483 (1965) (seven year old son
sometimes taken along); Kirstukas v. Kirstukas, 14 Md. App. 190, 197, 286 A.2d 535, 539
(1972).
259. Wallis v. Wallis, 235 Md. 33, 35, 200 A.2d 164, 165 (1964); Barnard v. Godfrey, 157
Md. 264, 270, 271, 145 A. 614, 617 (1929). But see Kerger v. Kerger, 156 Md. 607, 608, 145
A. 10, 11 (1929), in which both parents were regular drinkers. The circuit court awarded
custody of one child to the father and custody of the other child to the mother. The Court of
Appeals affirmed without discussing the parents drinking problems.
260. Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md. 184, 187, 148 A.2d 387, 389 (1959) (other facts proba-
bly were more important than the father's low moral standards).
261. In Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 360, 157 A.2d 442, 448 (1960), the mother's lying,
combined with other character traits, convinced a majority of the court that she was unfit to
have custody. Two judges dissented.
262. Cockerham v. Children's Aid Soc'y, 185 Md. 97, 100, 43 A.2d 197, 199 (1945); Bar-
nard v. Godfrey, 157 Md. 264, 270, 145 A. 614, 617 (1929).
263. In Radford v. Matczuk, 223 Md. 483, 164 A.2d 904 (1960), the father had been con-
victed of stealing government property, had served an eight month sentence in prison, and
had been dishonorably discharged from the armed services. In support of its conclusion that
his visitation rights should be enforced, the court indicated that the father's "life of crime"
had not continued after his conviction. Id. at 490, 164 A.2d at 908.
264. Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 360, 157 A.2d 442, 448 (1960).
265. 242 Md. 143, 218 A.2d 194 (1966).
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court described as "'hardcore' pornography by any standard. ' 266 The
record on appeal also indicated that the chancellor was displeased with
some of the mother's conduct - she had received money and valuable
property pursuant to a contract in which she had agreed that the father
would have custody, and subsequently had used some of the pictures
from the father's collection as a weapon to get her boys back without
returning any of the property and cash. The Court of Appeals could
have censured both parents, or could have viewed custody as a reward
or a punishment for one parent or the other. The court did neither.
The mother's conduct was said to be relevant only to the extent that it
indicated whether she would be a better custodian than the father.2 67
As to the father's collection, the court first noted that he had stopped
collecting new photographs approximately ten years earlier and had
never shown them to the boys. The court then concluded:
It is not within the functions or competence of courts to pass judg-
ment upon a man's private tastes or hobbies unless these interests
are transmuted into character, and then only to the extent that they
influence, or are apt to influence, the legal relationships with
which the law must deal .. 268
E. "Split Custody"
When custody disputes involve two or more children, the court
might have to consider whether custody should be "split" between two
claimants - whether one or more should live with one claimant, and
the other child or children, with the other.269 Maryland cases rely on
the proposition that "[o]rdinarily, the best interests and welfare of the
children of the same parents are best served by keeping them together
to grow up as brothers and sisters under the same roof. ' 270 These cases
give several reasons: Children should not be deprived of each other's
companionship when they have lost the companionship of one or both
266. Id. at 147, 218 A.2d at 197.
267. Id.
268. Id. Maryland law is consistent with the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, § 402,
9A UNIF. L. ANN. 197 (1979), which provides: "The court shall not consider conduct of a
proposed custodian that does not affect his relationship to the child."
269. "Split custody" sometimes is used as a label for decrees giving one parent custody
and the other parent the authority to make decisions concerning significant events in the
child's life. Eg., Paryne & Boyle, supra note 165, at 166; Zima, supra note 163, at 27. In all
of the Maryland cases cited in notes 270-76 infra, this label was used when the issue was
whether two or more children should live with the same custodian. This is how "split cus-
tody" is used in this article.
270. Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 359, 157 A.2d 442, 447 (1960).
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parents;27' children ought not be raised in "hostile camps";272 and, in
one case, the court reasoned that two brothers should be kept together
because, "[i]f there is one thing that a boy needs in a house it is another
boy. ' 273 Nevertheless, "when separation becomes necessary or inevita-
ble .. .there is no reason why it should not be done, ' 27 4 and if it
appears that split custody is in the best interests of all of the children
involved, the courts will make such an award.275 When such an award
is made, however, the court can, and should, maintain some contact
between siblings by including an appropriate provision in its decree.27 6
Only one change should be made in Maryland's approach to "split
custody." The proposition that "folrdinarily, the best interests and wel-
fare of the children of the same parents are best served by keeping [the
children] together, '277 expresses a preference that should be discarded.
In each case judges should ask whether it is in the children's best inter-
ests to keep them together, considering all circumstances affecting their
welfare. Judges should not assume that this issue should be resolved
the same way in all cases. Each case uniquely combines many different
factors, all of which should be evaluated.
F. Characteristics of the Environment in which the Child Might Live
Various characteristics of the environment accompanying a partic-
ular home may be relevant. Courts may compare the physical charac-
teristics of the houses where the child might live, and the number of
occupants in each.278 If it will be necessary for the child to live in a
boarding school if custody is awarded to a particular claimant, the de-
sirability of such a living arrangement should be considered.279 Also, it
is important to evaluate the many intangible factors that might contrib-
ute to the child's well-being, such as the extent to which the child's
271. Burns v. Bines, 189 Md. 157, 165, 55 A.2d 487, 490 (1947) (father serving life sen-
tence for having killed mother - their two children kept together).
272. Roussey v. Roussey, 210 Md. 261, 264, 123 A.2d 354, 356 (1956).
273. Kartman v. Kartman, 163 Md. 19, 26, 161 A. 269, 271 (1932). And perhaps a dog?
274. Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 359, 157 A.2d 442, 447 (1960).
275. See Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 372 A.2d 231, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977);
Daubert v. Daubert, 239 Md. 303, 211 A.2d 323 (1965); Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md. 184,
148 A.2d 387 (1959); and Kerger v. Kerger, 156 Md. 607, 145 A. 10 (1929), in all of which
"split" custody was awarded.
276. See Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md. 184, 190, 148 A.2d 387, 390 (1959).
277. Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 359, 157 A.2d 442, 447 (1960) (emphasis added).
278. Bray v. Bray, 225 Md. 476, 479, 171 A.2d 500, 502 (1961); Melton v. Connolly, 219
Md. 184, 187, 148 A.2d 387, 388-89 (1959); Alston v. Thomas, 161 Md. 617, 621, 158 A. 24,
25 (1932).
279. Sibley v. Sibley, 187 Md. 358, 363, 50 A.2d 128, 130 (1946).
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"curiosity in intellectual matters" will be stimulated,2"' whether the
child would experience a "subconscious strain [if] brought up in a reli-
gion different from that of his father and sisters, ' 281' and whether the
child has been receiving religious training from his or her current cus-
todians, but would receive little if any from the other person seeking
custody.282 However, the mere fact that "a parent teaches a child reli-
gious doctrines which are at variance with those of the majority is not a
ground for a change of custody," 283 and Maryland courts will not deny
visitation to a parent merely because he or she has remarried in viola-
tion of the beliefs of the religious faith in which the child is being
raised.284
The length of time a child has lived in a particular environment is
also important because it may be harmful to remove a happy and well
adjusted child from a stable and familiar environment.28 5 It also is
risky to award custody to a person who will move the child to another
state or country, not only because the child may be moved to an unfa-
miliar environment, but also because "it might become difficult or im-
possible for [a Maryland court] to have effective control in the
future. '28 6 If, however, the child will be removed from Maryland only
for short periods of time, there is less reason to be concerned about the
court's loss of "supervisory power. ' 28 7 Moreover, even if the court will
lose all control over the child, the basic purpose of custody litigation is
to deiermine what will be in the child's best interests, not to jealously
guard the court's "power." This probably explains why Maryland
courts sometimes express no concern about losing control over children
280. Andrews v. Andrews, 242 Md. 143, 149, 218 A.2d 194, 198 (1966).
281. Daubert v. Daubert, 239 Md. 303, 309-10, 211 A.2d 323, 327 (1965) (religious strain
results "whatever the religions involved may be").
282. Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md. 184, 187, 148 A.2d 387, 389 (1959); Ross v. Pick, 199
Md. 341, 352, 86 A.2d 463, 469 (1952).
283. Levitsky v. Levitsky, 231 Md. 388, 398, 190 A.2d 621, 626 (1963). In this case, the
circuit court awarded custody to the mother notwithstanding her refusal to allow her child to
have a necessary blood transfusion and her unequivocal statement that her religious beliefs
would prompt her to deny consent in the future even if the result might be "swift and sudden
death." Id. at 394, 190 A.2d at 623. The Court of Appeals concluded that the first and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution gave the mother an absolute right
to believe whatever she chose, but not an absolute right to act if her acts would jeopardize
the life of her child. The Court of Appeals therefore concluded that the custody decree
should be amended to provide that under certain circumstances the mother's consent to
blood transfusions would not be necessary.
284. England v. Megear, 145 Md. 574, 579, 125 A. 731, 732 (1924).
285. Trenton v. Christ, 216 Md. 418, 423, 140 A.2d 660, 662 (1958); Piotrowski v. State,
179 Md. 377, 383, 18 A.2d 199, 201 (1941); Powers v. Hadden, 30 Md. App. 577, 592, 353
A.2d 641, 650 (1976) (Davidson, J., dissenting).
286. Sullivan v. Auslaender, 12 Md. App. 1, 18-19, 276 A.2d 698, 708 (1971).
287. Barsallo v. Barsallo, 18 Md. App. 560, 569, 308 A.2d 457, 462 (1973).
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when awarding custody to parents who will not live in Maryland.288
Other possibly relevant characteristics of the environment in
which the child might live include such things as race and culture. In
Kauten v. Kauten ,289 the custody of an eight-year-old girl was awarded
to her mother, thereby placing her in a family consisting of her and her
mother, who were both white, and the mother's illegitimate child,
whose father was black. The eight-year-old's white father argued that
he should be awarded custody because of the "deleterious effects the
child might suffer from the discrimination which might befall her
younger half sister who is half white. ' 29 ° The court responded: "The
simple answer to this contention is that such potential problems are
only one factor in determining where the best interests of the child
lie."
29 1
In regard to "culture," two Maryland cases are of particular inter-
est. In Barsa//o v. Barsaio,292 the Court of Appeals noted that one rea-
son for enlarging the father's visitation rights from Sunday afternoons
to one month each year at his home in Panama was the possibility that
his nine-year-old daughter might thereby "absorb some of the culture
and language of her Panamanian ancestry and thus broaden her educa-
tion. '293 However, in Sullivan v. Aus/aender,294 the Court of Special
Appeals refused to enforce a parental agreement that the father was to
have custody in Israel for three years and that the mother was then to
have custody in Maryland for three years. Although the court whs jus-
tifiably concerned about the possible adverse effect of uprooting the
two children in three years, and about its loss of effective control while
the children were in Israel, the court's decision to award custody exclu-
sively to the mother is a little disturbing. The court deprived the chil-
dren of an opportunity to "absorb some of the culture and language of
their ancestry," and allowed the mother to disregard the custody agree-
ment notwithstanding the circuit court's conclusion that enforcement of
the agreement was in the children's best interests.295
288. See Andrews v. Andrews, 242 Md. 143, 218 A.2d 194 (1966); (custody to father who
lived in Mexico); Sibley v. Sibley, 187 Md. 358, 50 A.2d 128 (1946) (custody to father who
lived in Texas).
289. 257 Md. 10, 261 A.2d 759 (1970).
290. Id. at 13, 261 A.2d at 761.
291. Id.
292. 18 Md. App. 560, 308 A.2d 457 (1973).
293. Id. at 570, 308 A.2d at 462.
294. 12 Md. App. 1, 17-18, 276 A.2d 698, 707 (1971).
295. See id. A third Maryland case is of interest although not in point. In Wakefield v.
Little Light, 276 Md. 333, 347 A.2d 228 (1975), the custody of a young Crow Indian boy was
awarded to his Indian mother who lived on a Crow reservation in Montana, even though the
boy had lived with his non-Indian substitute parents in Maryland for approximately two
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"Standard of living" is another potentially relevant characteristic
of the environment in which the child might live, but it is difficult to
assess the Maryland courts' attitude toward this factor. On the one
hand, the Court of Appeals said, in,4ston v. Thomas:29 6 "[Tihe station
in life and the poverty of the father is not to weigh against his claim,
since an humble status and indigence are the honorable condition of
many, and often the fruitful soil of virtue, discipline, and aspiration."
And in fact, custody has been awarded to a parent who was not a high
wage earner 297 and to one who was unemployed and living on social
security payments. 298 These cases properly considered standard of liv-
ing to be relevant but not controlling. On the other hand, a close read-
ing of some cases where custody was awarded to the claimant who
could provide the higher standard of living, might lead some readers to
suspect that this factor was given too much weight.299 Indeed, in,41s/on
v. Thomas, the fact that the father was "unable to support his present
family, and, for some time, [had] been the object of public charity, ' 300
was arguably one of the key factors that led the court to conclude that
the child's foster parents should be allowed to adopt the child notwith-
standing the father's refusal to consent.
The only other "standard of living" issue that we should consider
is the extent to which a parent's need to earn a living should be viewed
as a negative factor because of that parent's inability to be with his or
her child while on the job. The Court of Appeals concluded in 1956
that employment outside the home "should not be controlling. Work-
ing mothers are commonplace in the present day and babysitters are a
national institution. . . . With adequate support from the father, we
see no reason why custody should be denied to the mother on this
ground."3 1' This solution to the problem makes as much sense today
and one-half years. The court reasoned that it was obligated to respect a previous decree of
the Crow Court of Indian Offenses terminating that court's earlier appointment of the sub-
stitute parents as the child's temporary guardians for one year. Id. at 343, 351, 347 A.2d at
234, 238. However, although not mentioned, the possibility that it may have been in the
child's best interests to be raised as an Indian with his Indian mother and relatives, may
have had some effect on the court's decision.
296. 161 Md. 617, 620, 158 A. 24, 25 (1932); accord, McClary v. Follett, 226 Md. 436, 442,
174 A.2d 66, 69 (1961).
297. McClary v. Follett, 226 Md. 436, 442, 174 A.2d 66, 69 (1961); Montgomery County
Dep't of Social Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 424, 381 A.2d 1154, 1165 (1978).
298. Palmer v. Palmer, 238 Md. 327, 330, 207 A.2d 481, 483 (1965).
299. See, e.g., Wood v. Wood, 227 Md. 112, 114, 175 A.2d 573, 574 (1961); Parker v.
Parker, 222 Md. 69, 73, 158 A.2d 607, 609 (1960), and particularly, Cockerham v. Children's
Aid Soc'y, 185 Md. 97, 101-02, 43 A.2d 197, 199 (1945).
300. Alston v. Thomas, 161 Md. 617, 621, 158 A. 24, 25 (1932).
301. Roussey v. Roussey, 210 Md. 261, 264, 123 A.2d 354, 356 (1956); see also Dunnigan
v. Dunnigan, 182 Md. 47, 31 A.2d 634 (1943), where the mother's having to work because
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as it did in 1956 and should also be used when it is in a child's best
interests to live with a "working father. 30 2
G. Recommendation of a Psychologist, Psychiatrist, or Social Worker
Maryland has no statute requiring that child custody cases be in-
vestigated by a psychologist, psychiatrist, or social worker, but it is
clearly within a court's authority to recommend or order such an inves-
tigation.30 3 When the investigation is completed, the court must deter-
mine how much weight to give the professional's opinion. If the
witness is properly qualified, has no personal interest in the outcome of
the litigation, and has provided a well reasoned, objective evaluation of
what the court might do to further the child's best interests, it might
seem to follow that the expert's opinion should be given "great
weight. '' 3°  However, Maryland courts have insisted that the opinions
of such witnesses are advisory only, are never "controlling," and should
be viewed as merely another circumstance to consider along with all
other relevant circumstances.
30 5
Montgomery County Department of Social Services v. Sanders,3 °6
seems to be the only Maryland case explaining the failure to give such
testimony special weight.30 7 Quoting from a law review article, the
Court of Special Appeals said: "'[Slocial workers sometimes develop
'rescue fantasies' in well-intentioned efforts to save helpless children
from bad parents. These emotions tend to obscure objective evalua-
the father was not helping to support her and their two children was not mentioned as a
circumstance weighing against an award in her favor.
302. There are no Maryland appellate cases in point. Cf. Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508,
517, 374 A.2d 900, 905 (1977). The Court of Appeals, relying on the language of MD. ANN.
CODE art. 72A, § 1 (1978), and the mandate of Maryland's Equal Rights Amendment, MD.
CoNST. Decl. of Rights. art. 46 (enacted 1972), held that child support is an obligation to be
shared by both parents "in accordance with their respective financial resources." Even
though the mother had custody in Rand, the principle of a proportional division of child
support also should apply where a "working father" is awarded custody.
303. McClary v. Follett, 226 Md. 436, 443, 174 A.2d 66, 69-70 (1961); Powers v. Hadden,
30 Md. App. 577, 587, 353 A.2d 641, 647 (1976). When a court appointed investigator testi-
fies, "at the request of either party, [he or she] may be called as the court's witness, [and is]
subject to cross-examination by both parties." Draper v. Draper, 39 Md. App. 73, 81, 382
A.2d 1095, 1099 (1978).
304. See, e.g., Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 1397-1400, 140 N.W.2d 152, 156-58
(1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1967).
305. Palmer v. Palmer, 238 Md. 327, 331, 207 A.2d 481, 484 (1965); McClary v. Follett,
226 Md. 436, 443, 174 A.2d 66, 69-70 (1961); Bray v. Bray, 225 Md. 476, 481, 171 A.2d 500,
503 (1961).
306. 38 Md. App. 406, 424, 381 A.2d 1154, 1165 (1977).
307. See, e.g., Palmer v. Palmer, 238 Md. 327, 332, 207 A.2d 481,484 (1965); Bray v. Bray
225 Md. 476, 481, 171 A.2d 500, 503 (1961); Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md. 184, 188, 148 A.2d
387, 389 (1959); Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 346, 86 A.2d 463, 466 (1952).
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tions of the strengths of the child's own home.' "308 In addition, the
court warned that if reliance upon the testimony of social workers, psy-
chologists, or psychiatrists is "too obsequious or routine," it might
"lead the courts, in acts of misapplied psychology, to separate unjustly
family members."3 °9 The court also offered a more telling (and less
judgmental) reason - that caution is particularly important when one
of the litigants cannot afford to hire experts to "match the weight of the
experts brought forth by" the other side.310 However, the court failed
to see that miscellaneous statements made elsewhere in Sanders might
provide the basis for a better reason: "'[C]ustody cases are like finger-
prints because no two are exactly the same.' ,,311 "There can be very
little constructive or useful precedent on the subject of custody determi-
nations, because each case must depend upon its uniquefactpattern.3 12
"Present methods for determining a child's best interest . . . involve a
multitude of intangible factors ... ."' And finally, "[t]he court
should examine the totality of the situation . . . and avoidfocusing on
any singlefactor. . .. -"3 " Although these comments were not made in
reference to the weight accorded an expert's opinion, they support the
conclusion that no special weight ought to be given. The court is right
- each custody dispute is unique and involves a multitude of complex,
intangible factors, all of which should be taken into consideration;
therefore, the courts should "avoid focusing on any singlefactor," not
even the opinion of a highly skilled and perceptive professional who is
both objective and impartial.
CONCLUSION
When parents separate or demand the return of a child who is
living with substitute parents, "it is always the child who is not only the
innocent victim, but who has the most at stake. 31 5 Thus, the child's
best interests should be the focal point of such cases, not the "rights" of
adults.
These cases are particularly difficult because of the complexity of
308. Montgomery County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. at 424, 381 A.2d
at 1165 (quoting Thomas, ChildAbuse and Neglect Part : Historical Overview, Legal Matrix,
and Social Perspective, 50 N.C.L. REV. 293, 347 (1972)).
309. 38 Md. App. at 423, 381 A.2d at 1165.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 414, 381 A.2d at 1160 (emphasis added) (quoting Mullinix v. Mullinix, 12 Md.
App. 402, 412, 278 A.2d 674, 679 (1971).
312. 30 Md. App. at 419, 381 A.2d at 1162 (emphasis added).
313. Id. at 419, 381 A.2d at 1163 (emphasis added).
314. Id. at 420-21, 381 A.2d at 1163 (emphasis added).
315. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 174, 372 A.2d 582, 584 (1977).
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the factors affecting the child's best interests. Each person involved is
unique; the intricacies of the many human relationships interwoven
into each dispute defy simplification; the environments in which the
child might live are often significantly different; all of these tangible
and intangible factors change as time passes. Add that the judge must
predict the future while the child's family is disintegrating or threaten-
ing to disintegrate, and it is easy to understand why Maryland courts
adopted three rules that simplified decision making: (1) a preference
favoring mothers when young children were involved;316 (2) a pre-
sumption that an adulterous parent was "unfit";3 17 and (3) a presump-
tion that custody should be awarded to biological parents rather than to
others.31 8
The Maryland legislature and courts subsequently discarded two
of the three rules. The Court of Appeals abolished the presumption
that an adulterous parent is "unfit," holding that a parent's conduct is
relevant only if it has had, or will have, some actual effect on the child's
welfare. 319 The Court of Special Appeals concluded that Maryland's
maternal preference doctrine was abolished by a statute providing:
"[Iln any custody proceeding, neither parent shall be given a preference
solely because of his or her sex."' 32° The court's conclusion is consistent
with the growing realization that a child needs good "parenting" and
that the courts should always try to determine which parent in fact has
the skills, interests, attitudes, capacity for affection, and personality
characteristics that are most likely to further the child's welfare.
Should Maryland also discard the presumption that custody be
awarded to biological parents rather than to others? The Court of Spe-
cial Appeals recently used this presumption rather than one favoring
"psychological parents."' 32 ' Both should have been rejected. Mary-
land's commitment to the best interests principle is compromised by
any presumption. Presumptions improperly focus attention on one cir-
cumstance, diverting attention from the many other tangible and intan-
gible factors affecting a child's welfare. Presumptions also improperly
restrict the decisionmaker's discretion. Discretion is necessary because
of the nature of child custody litigation - each child is unique; each
potential custodian is unique; each case uniquely combines many dif-
316. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 67-73.
319. Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 372 A.2d 231, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 539 (1977).
320. McAndrew v. McAndrew, 39 Md. App. 1, 382 A.2d 1081 (1978); (construing MD.
ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (1978)).




ferent circumstances affecting the child's welfare. The courts must
have sufficient freedom to resolve each case on its unique facts, because
only then can they be as responsive as possible to the needs of each
child. There should be no presumptions.
Discarding all presumptions does not, however, insure full com-
mitment to the best interests principle. To achieve this goal, the courts
must identify and evaluate all circumstances affecting each child's wel-
fare. For example, the courts always should determine whether to
award "joint custody." Should the child live with one parent or with
both on an alternating time basis? Should one or both parents resolve
important problems in the child's life? The child's interests will be af-
fected significantly by the court's answers to these joint custody ques-
tions. Parental agreements also merit careful consideration if the
parents were sensitive to the child's interests and were not using cus-
tody as a bargaining tool for resolving other issues, such as alimony or
a division of property. The child's preference concerning custody is
relevant if the child is sufficiently mature to form a rational judgment
and he or she was not improperly "coached." The child's physical, psy-
chological, intellectual, and spiritual needs - and each potential custo-
dian's ability to respond to these needs - are important. The many
tangible and intangible factors concerning each possible custodian and
the environments each will provide the child, are relevant insofar as
they actually affect the child's welfare. Relationships between the child
and persons other than the custodians also are important, particularly
relationships with children who will live in the same home. Will the
child have a good relationship with a particular step-brother or step-
sister? Should siblings live with the same custodian?
To continue listing relevant factors would be superfluous because
the conclusion is already clear. Full commitment to the best interests
principle means that there should be no presumptions and that custody
awards should not be based on any one factor. Custody should be
awarded only after a thoughtful evaluation of all relevant circum-
stances - those actually affecting the child's welfare - convinces the
decisionmaker that a particular award is the one most likely to further
the child's best interests.
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